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No man can serve two masters; for either hw will hate the one, adt love the
other; or else will hold to one, a-ad despise 4w other. Math. 6:24.*
THE recent case of Kinney v. Glenny I raises interesting and im-
portant problems of business and of law and poses questions that
require for their disposal an appreciation and appraisal of the
methods employed in marketing and distributing securities. The
problems involved cover a wide range. In general they pertain
to the fiduciary relationship between broker and customer, and
between dealer and customer; the various business situations
wherein the broker or dealer acquires an adverse interest to the
customer; and the legal rights and duties flowing therefrom.
There will be examined not only the report of the case but also
the record and such additional, independent sources of informa-
tion as throw light on the nature of the business and legal prob-
lems involved and as orient the specific point at issue in the
Kinney case.
The Reported Case
From the reports of the case the following facts and rulings ap-
peared: Plaintiff brought suit in equity to rescind an agreement
for the purchase of 500 shares of preferred stock of Consolidated
Automatic Merchandising Corporation. Defendants were stock-
brokers doing business in Buffalo. Plaintiff had been dealing in
stocks through them for some time prior to February 13, 1929,
and on that date placed an order with them for the purchase of
said 500 shares at a price of $35/. a share "or better." The stock
was listed on the New York Curb Market and plaintiff claimed
that the order included a direction to buy the stock on the Curb.
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This defendants denied; and the evidence was conflicting. Upon
receiving the order, defendants, by telephone, called F. J. Lisman
& Co. of New York City, "the bankers in charge of the issue,"
and inquired whether they could supply the stock at the price
named. F. J. Lisman & Co. after ascertaining the price of the
stock on the Curb wrote defendants as follows:
"In accordance with telephonic advices of even date, we are
pleased to confirm sale to you of: 500 shares CONSOLIDATED
AUTOMATIC MERCHANDISING CORPORATION, Preferred
Stock at 35 less 1 point concession to you.
."It is understood that you are to protect the above numbers for
a period of sixty days, reimbursing us the 1% per share allowed
at time of delivery, should any of the above numbers be repur-
chased in the open market at or below the price of 35, per
share."
The stock was not purchased on the Curb but taken from the
stock F. J. Lisman & Co. were marketing. Thus defendants ar-
ranged to pay $34.50 per share for the stock, subject to the obli-
gation on their part to repay F. J. Lisman & Co. $1 per share
for any of the stock coming on the open market within sixty
days at $35.50 per share or less. In notifying plaintiff of the
purchase at $35.50 per share, defendants said nothing about the
concession received. In addition, they charged plaintiff the
regular Curb commission of $75. Plaintiff held the stock for
longer than sixty days. Plaintiff, on discovering the facts, ten-
dered back the shares to the defendants and asked for the return
of the purchase price and the commission. The lower court gave
judgment for plaintiff, saying it was unnecessary to determine
whether plaintiff instructed defendants to buy the stock on the
Curb. The court stated that an "agent" must deal with his "prin-
cipal" with the "utmost good faith;" that defendants plainly
violated this rule of conduct; that it was their duty to communi-
cate to plaintiff all terms of the arrangement with F. J. Lisman
& Co.; that by not communicating the facts and retaining for
themselves the benefit of the concession defendants elected to
treat the agreement with F. J. Lisman & Co. as an agreement
made with themselves as "principals." The court added:
"They cannot be held to assert that the agreement was in part
with themselves as principals and in part with themselves as
agent for their customers. They will be required to take the one
position or the other in its entirety, and by their action in treat-
ing that portion of the arrangement relating to the concession
as their own contract, they have put themselves in the position
of assuming the whole of the contract and thereby becoming pur-
chasers of the stock from Lisman & Co." 2
2 136 Misc. at 304, 240 N. Y. Supp. at 717.
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On appeal to the Appellate Division the judgment was re-
versed, the court saying:
"The taking of a secret profit by a broker does not make him
in law the purchaser of the stock or committed therefor, at least
so far as his customer is concerned. In such case the customer
is injured in the amount of the undisclosed vails acquired by the
agent, and in a proper action he may recover them.... The inci-
dent does not change the transaction from one of the execution
of an order by a broker for his client to one of the sale to the
broker individually, and thus on to a sale by the broker of his
own property to his customer."
On further appeal to the Court of Appeals the judgment of the
Appellate Division was affirmed without opinion, Lehman, J.,
dissenting without opinion.4
Security Distribution
In the course of this discussion reference will briefly be made
to a number of customs and practices in the securities business
which it may be well to clarify in advance. Dealers in securities
are not unlike other dealers in commodities (or services) who
buy at one price and attempt to find buyers at a price sufficiently
higher to yield them a net profit above expenses; or who find
buyers at a given price and attempt to buy at a price sufficiently
lower to yield a similar net profit. Their customers are institu-
tions and individuals. Their sources of securities are the issuing
individuals, institutions, corporations, or civil divisions, other
dealers, dealer combinations (of which they may be members),
investors, and the open market.
The originating of new and refunding issues is largely con-
fined to a few large houses, while their distribution is accom-
plished through both large and small dealers. In the original
distribution of an issue, the average dealer acquires his securi-
ties from a large merchant banker originating the issue, through
participation in a syndicate or group committed for, or having
an option on, such securities, or, as an outside dealer, from such
syndicates or groups or their members. During the original
distribution such an outside dealer may obtain securities from
selling group or syndicate members at a small, dealers' conces-
sion, called a "reallowance," which usually entails no immediate
penalty-invoking Yesponsibility as to investment placement.
Dealers may also at times acquire securities from a member
(usually not the manager) of such groups and syndicates at a
discount greater than the "dealer reallowance" by guaranteeing
that such securities will not be penalized, will not come onto the
3 231 App. Div. at 312-13; 247 N. Y. Supp. at 120.
4 Supra note 1.
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market at or below the list price, or will not come onto the open
market, during the life of the group or syndicate.
Upon the failure of an original distributing effort either to
sell all the securities or to place them satisfactorily so that a
disproportionate amount will not come upon the open market,
secondary distribution, so-called, is sometimes undertaken to sell
the unsold securities or to resell those which come back on the
market. This would customarily be undertaken at the close of
the selling syndicate or selling group. Dealers are invited by
the sponsoring merchant banker to sell the securities against
confirmation at the last sale price in the open market and are
promised for their services a concession which is usually con-
tingent upon the securities remaining off the open market for a
certain minimum period of time. Something akin to secondary
distribution is sometimes undertaken for older issues when it is
desirable to dispose of a large block or to redistribute to investors
a floating supply which endangers market stability.
Other sources open to the dealer involve older, outstanding
issues: These include the open market and individual investors.
Probably the most important sources among investors are the
dealer's customers from whom he acquires securities in trade
for those he sells. The open market includes both the recognized
"exchanges" and the over-the-counter market. Both are "mar-
kets," except that the exchanges provide meeting-places and spe-
cial government. The dealer may take a speculative position
through either market. Through the over-the-counter market he
is frequently able, as a dealer, to buy at less than the "asked"
price and make his profit through resale at the "asked" price.
This last method he normally employs only when he buys against
an order.
The broker, on the other hand, when acting purely as such,
confines his transactions largely to the open market, either over-
the-counter or on the exchanges. He may act for two customers
under certain circumstances or through circularization attempt
to find buyers or sellers for securities offered or for which he
has bids, though all such trades off the exchanges may be classed
as over-the-counter transactions. His compensation is received
in the form of a fee or commission for services rendered.
So-called brokers act as dealers, to a certain extent, in some
transactions. As is well known, many houses undertake both
security selling and brokerage fuiictions. They may likewise
originate and underwrite security issues, as well as perform any
number of allied functions. The broker who does not undertake
to retail securities, in the usual sense, however, frequently steps
into the dealer's shoes in executing orders over-the-counter.
Upon receiving an order to buy or sell an unlisted security, he
obtains over-the-counter quotations. If he is able to buy only at
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the "asked" price or sell at the "bid" price, he executes his order
as a broker and charges his customer a commission, but if he
finds that as a dealer he can arrange to buy below the "asked"
or sell above the "bid" prices and his dealers' spread is greater
than his normal commission, he may elect to buy or sell for his
own account and resell to or buy from his customer, whom he
would then charge no commission. In recent years a somewhat
similar practice has developed with respect to original and sec-
ondary distribution and redistribution, both of listed and unlisted
securities. In many, if not the majority, of these cases the con-
cession which the "broker" secures in lieu of his commission is
contingent upon guaranteeing investment placement for a speci-
fied period of time. An exception is when the broker accepts
merely the "dealer reallowance" on a syndicated issue.
In both types of situations, it is customary for "brokers" to
distinguish these from the regular brokerage transactions by
charging no commissions to their customers and by confirming,
in case of purchases, "Sold to," "We have sold to you," or "We
confirm sale to you," instead of "Bought for" or "We have
bought for your account and risk" and, in case of sales, "Bought
from" or "We have bought from you," instead of "Sold for" or
"We have sold for your account and risk." In so far as none
of these dealer types of transactions are executed on exchanges,
it may be thought superficially that the presence of a commission
and the one type of confirmation are confined to exchange trans-
actions and the absence of a commission and the other type of
confirmation are confined to over-the-counter and dealer trans-
actions. Actually, of course, strict brokerage transactions are
made over-the-counter, a commission is charged, and the con-
firmation states, "We have (bought or sold) for your account
and risk."
"Cameo" and Secondary Distributino
The place of the Kinney case in the foregoing brief description
of the security business seems clear. It appears that defendants'
firm, Glenny, lonro & Moll, were both dealers and brokers,
(probably the former chiefly, as will appear hereafter.) The
disputed transaction involved Consolidated Automatic Merchan-
dising, or "Camco," preferred stock which was apparently in
process of secondary distribution at the time. Mr. Traugott, a
partner in the investment banking finn of F. J. Lisman & Co.
which sponsored the issue, when questioned as to the service to
be rendered for which the concession was allowed, testified:
"Well, it is really an amount of money or a concession or a com-
mission paid a dealer for.... A concession is really an amount
of money paid for service rendered. . . . There were several
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services to be rendered. After the expiration of a syndicate or
a selling group some stock is always placed in weak hands. That
is, there is always a man that wants to buy for a rise or other-
wise.... For a speculation, wants to buy for a rise in price; the
sharpshooters we call them, and your protection in the group
necessarily ends at a certain time, and it is not sufficient to get
that stock really placed among investors. It is for that reason
that after the group has expired the house of underwriting....
And therefore the house of issue is very-we will say they are
anxious to get this stock in the protection of a market placed
with investors. We will at times buy stock at prices much higher
than we are able to sell it at, and even then allow a concession
or a commission for the distribution of that stock among sup-
posed investors.... It gives you a duofold market. It gives a
double market for every purchaser of CAMCO.... Weak hands
are speculators ... the stock that was distributed in the original
group, some of it goes to investors, some of it goes to specula-
tors. Weak hands are speculators, because they are playing for
a turn. . . . As I was about to say, it helps the stockholder be-
cause it places and makes a market for his stock. It helps F. J.
Lisman & Company, because it helps us maintain that market,
and by selling the stock to the supposed investor our purchasing
power is increased, so that we may on the Curb purchase further
stock in support of that issue." 5
In confirming the disputed transactions, defendants used the
form, "confirming sale to you," but charged a regular exchange
commission and maintained throughout that they acted as bro-
kers for the plaintiff.
Published information on the Consolidated Automatic Mer-
chandising Corporation issues is meager, but, such as it is, may
provide some background for the problem. The plaintiff testified
that
"When I was in New York in July [1929] it was then that I
started to inquire about this company and its prospects ... and
talking to brokers there ... I was told that this Cameo Com-
pany-that before this merger took place-I learned this in July
-that they tried to float some sort of a bond issue; not being
successful in that they then formed this company, merged,
and put this stock out and sold it." r
The only related bond issue of public record sponsored by the
same banking house was the $4,500,000 General Vending Corpo-
ration 6% 10-year Secured Sinking Fund Gold Bonds maturing
on August 15, 1937. This issue was offered to the public in Octo-
ber, 1927, by F. J. Lisman & Co. and B. J. VanIngen & Co. at
$Record, pp. 108, 109, 110. The record referred to throughout ij the
record on appeal to the Court of Appeals.
6 Record, pp. 85, 86.
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98 and interest. The General Vending Corporation was incor-
porated in Virginia in 1927.7
About the middle of June, 1928, it was announced that a
merger of automatic merchandising machine companies would be
financed by F. J. Lisman & Co. and that common and preferred
stocks of the new company had been admitted to "when issued"
trading on the Chicago and Boston stock exchanges on June 7.
A Delaware corporation had been formed on May 29 to hold the
stocks of five merging companies. The Commercial and Fiza-
cial Chranicle's summary of new financing in June, 1928, included
an issue of 200,000 units of Camco stock at $55 a unit consisting
of one share of preferred and one-half share of common stock. 10
This is evidently in error, since the units were not offered to
the public until August. It is possible that the issue was planned
for June, judging from the advance publicity released, but was
postponed because of the unfavorable market developments of
that month. This may be borne out by the fact that in the public
offering in August the content of the units, which were still
priced at $55, was increased to one share of preferred and one
share of common stock.
About the first of August, 1928, it was announced that the
merger had been approved.Y On August 6, large newspaper
advertisements announced the consolidation of General Vending
Corporation, Sanitary Postage Service Corporation, Automatic
Merchandising Corporation of America, Remington Service Ma-
chines, Inc., and Schermack Corporation of America under the
Consolidated Automatic Merchandising Corporation. Camco
machines were to be produced and guaranteed by the Remington
Arms Company.12 The public offering of securities was made
through F. J. Lisman & Co. on August 7. Stock was offered in
units of one share of $3.50 Cumulative Convertible Preferred
Stock, no par, (bearing dividends from August 1, 1928, payable
quarterly commencing September 15; convertible for five years
into common stock, the first 50,000 shares tendered to receive
11 shares of common per share, the second 50,000 11/, shares,
the third 50,000 1 1/10 shares, and the final 50,000 1 share) and
1 share (voting trust certificates) of common stock, at a price
of $55 a unit. There was a statement in fine type in the offering
advertisement that "The Corporation is to guarantee principal
and interest of $4,500,000 General Vending Corporation 6%c Ten
7PooR'S, Industrial Section-1930.
8 (1928) 126 CommRCiAL & FizANcIAL CHRONICLE [hereafter cited Cin.]
3761.
9 (1928) 126 Cm. 3933.
10 (1928) 127 CHR. 176.
1 (1928) 127 CmR. 686.
12Wall Street Journal, Aug. 6, 1928, at 7.
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Year Secured Gold Notes." 13
The New York Curb Market admitted 200,000 shares of the
preferred and voting trust certificates for 2,050,000 shares of
common to temporary listing on August 8, to be traded in sepa-
ikately on a "when, as and if issued" basis. The listing statement
shows that Camco was formed "under the auspices of the United
Cigar Stores Company of America and prominent parties inter-
ested in the Sanitary Postage Service Corporation.
"With a view to establishing a company which should become
a leading factor in the automatic merchandising field, it was
decided to consolidate several large companies already in opera-
tion, so that great economy could be achieved in the management
of the consolidated enterprise, as well as in production, distribu-.
tion and the joint servicing of the automatic devices." It was
also stated that "The Remington Arms Company, known through-
out the world for its marvelous precision work, will serve as the
principal manufacturing end of the consolidated company. The
Remington Arms Company has an important stock interest in
the Consolidated Automatic Merchandising Corporation, and is
represented on the Board by its President." Estimated earnings
for three of the constituent companies for a ten year period in-
cluded earnings of $2,210,927 in 1928 and $18,719,303 in 1932.14
The plaintiff bought 100 of these units through or from the
defendants in September, 1928. From the direct examination
of the plaintiff: "Q. How did you first become interested in Con-
solidated Automatic Merchandising Corporation stock? A. Mr.
Thomas Balkin, who is employed by Glenny, Monro & Moll, (de-
fendants' firm) and whom I have known for a period of eight
or ten years, was in the habit of coming to my office, and I traded
with Glenny, Monro & Moll through him .... Eventually I gave
him an order to buy 100 units of Camco .... At $55 or better
per unit." 1 This purchase was evidently made during the life
of the syndicate or selling group referred to by Mr. Traugott.
Since this matter was only collateral to the issue in the case,
insufficient evidence was given to decide the exact nature of
the transaction, but from the fact that defendants' representa-
tive, Mr. Balkin, brought copies of circulars on Camco bearing
the imprint of F. J. Lisman & Co. to the plaintiff at the time,
it may fairly be inferred that defendants were selling the units
on selling group terms." The 100 units in question were sold
at the list price.17 Defendants' firm was listed with the trade as
"Participating Distributors & General Bond Dealers" as well
3 Wall Street Journal, Aug. 7, 1928.
'4 Listing Bulletins No. 174, New York Curb Market, Aug. 8, 1928,
" Record, pp. 55, 56, 57.
16 Record, pp. 74, 75, 157, 158.
1, Record, p. 57.
956 [Vol. 41
SECONDARY DISTRIBUTION
as stock brokers.8 That defendants' firm distributed securities
on such terms may also be inferred from the testimony of de-
fendants' cashier that the firm carried on its books a "Syndicate
selling commission account." 19 Then Mr. Balkin testified, "Q.
With respect to the original 100 shares of stock that Kinney
bought back in September, 1928, was there a similar arrange-
ment between you and Lisman? A. Yes. Not that I know of.
Wait a minute. I do not know what the arrangement was with
Lisman at that time.... Q. It was purchased from Lisman?
A. Yes. Q. Probably at a profit, was it not? A. I presume so." =0
Selling group restrictions on Camco preferred stock would
seem to have been in effect until about the middle of January,
1929. Sale prices on the Curb kept within the narrow range of
42 to 48 during the last five months of 1928. Curb sales were
4,500 shares in November and 6,300 shares in December, with
the range in December from 43 to 46 . In January, 1929, how-
ever, sales jumped to 17,600 shares and the stock reached a low
of 33 on January 26, having fallen from a high of 45 on Janu-
ary 5.2 There were only 300 shares sold on Friday, January 11,
and the range was 42.to 421, . In the first hour of trading on
the following day, Saturday, there was only one sale, at 41. In
the final hour, 1,500 shares were sold within the range of 38
to 4032 Assuming that an announcement had been made that
morning that selling group restrictions on the sale of stock would
be removed at the close of business (noon) that day (i. e., that
dealers would not thereafter be penalized by cancellation of com-
mission or redelivery of stock coming back onto the open mar-
ket), then some of this selling may have represented short sales
by some of Mr. Traugott's "sharpshooters." The market action
on Monday, January 14; substantiates this, since 1,100 shares
were traded within a range of 38 to 41 prior to the last sale,
and the next to last sale was of 100 shares at 40. Then 700
shares were bought "under the rule" at 43.23 It would seem that
short sellers on Saturday who were unable to borrow stock on
Monday were "bought in" for cash. Members of the selling group
would probably have been unwilling to lend their stock that day,
since it would have been delivered against contracts made before
the expiration of the group, on this assumption, and they would
have incurred a penalty. So although the group might have ex-
pired on January 12, the stock was really not "free," considering
the probable support given the market on January 14, until Tues-
3- SEcURITY DEALERS OF NORTH A=ERIC (1929 ed.).
29 Record, p. 193.
20 Record, p. 152.
21 (1928 and 1929) CHRONIcLE, Bank & Quotation Supplements.




day, January 15. On that day, 1,300 shares were traded within
a range of 361/8 to 38. On January 16, 2,200 shares were traded
within a range of 353, to 36.24 Trading then began to slow up,
and the price of the preferred stock stabilized around 35 to 36.
It is not unlikely that F. J. Lisman & Co. acquired a consider-
able amount of the preferred stock during this stabilization
process which it could only dispose of satisfactorily by means of
secondary distribution.
Turning a moment to the action of, the common stock, this
sold within a range of 7 to 9/8 in August, 1928. In the fol-
lowing months it experienced considerable appreciation, and sold
within a range of 1258 to 17/, in January, 1929.21 An obvious
inference from the contrasting actions of the preferred and com-
mon stocks is that during the boom of 1928 and 1929 the security
buying public was more interested in common stocks, and when
the average buyer acquired the units he was more interested in
the common stock than in the preferred. As the two classes of
stock were traded in separately, he could sell the preferred and
hold or increase his holdings of common. If this were the case,
then F. J. Lisman & Co. was faced with an acute problem of sec-
ondary distribution for the preferred stock at the close of the
selling group.
A sample check of financial advertising of the period shows
that F. J. Lisman & Co. began to advertise the preferred stock
separately about the first of February, 1929.2 Since this adver-
tising did not refer to the common stock, it seems possible that
the bankers were not confronted with a problem of secondary
distribution on the common stock, that it was considered hopeless
to "put away with investors" so speculative a stock, or that sec-
ondary distribution of this type of security could better be accom-
plished through redistribution on the exchange.
It appears that, a few days prior to January 28, 1929, plaintiff
bought 200 shares of Camco preferred stock at 33 or 331/
through the defendants' firm. He sold these shares at 35 on
January28.27 Defendants' witness, Mr. Balkin, testified, on cross
examination, that these shares were acquired from F. J. Lisman
& Co. on the same terms as the 500 shares subsequently pur-
chased, but that Glenny, Munro & Moll did not gain the conces-
sion offered by the bankers because the stock came back on the
market within 60 days.&2 8 The stock was sold for the plaintiff on
24 Ibid.
25 (1928 and 1929) CHRONICLE, Bank and Quotation Supplement.
2 0 Boston News Bureau, Feb. 1 and 14, 1929.
27 Record, pp. 59, 60, 63, 140, 195.
28 Those 200 shares were sold for the plaintiff above the "protected price,"
so the penalty of commission refund must have been incurred in some later
transfer, presunabl- in March, 1929. There is the possibility, however,
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the Curb by defendants.o
With respect to the 500 share purchase involved in the suit
to rescind, it appears that the plaintiff had been out of the city
for about two weeks following his sale of the 200 shares and
on his return, finding messages from Mr. Balkin, called Mr.
Balkin about two o'clock on February 13, 1929, and placed an
order to buy 500 shares of Camco preferred stock at 351, or
better.3° Plaintiff claims and defendants deny specific instruc-
tions to buy the shares on the Curb.31 It does not appear from
the record whether there was any time limit on this order. Mr.
Balkin, for the defendants, on direct examination: "Q. Then did
you check the market after you talked with him the first time?
A. Yes .... I told him the market was 35 or 351/4 bid and the
stock was offered at 36, and that the last sale was 35K , and he
gave me an order to buy 500 shares at 35 . Q. Later in the day
did you call him back and tell him that you had bought that
stock? A. Yes .. . I told him we had bought the stock at 35 %
and it had closed that day at 36. It was after the close of the
market that I talked with him. Q. Did you tell him where you
bought it at that time? A. No." 2 On redirect examination:
"Q. After you received this telephone conversation from Mr.
Kinney to purchase 500 shares of stock, did you use your wire
through Hayden Stone to get the Curb price? A. Yes. Q. And
after you got that you told Mr. Kinney the bid and asked price?
A. Yes. Q. Is that right? A. Yes, that was checked through
Hayden Stone & Company. Q. Then you afterwards sought other
places to purchase it? A. Yes." M r. Balkin then turned the
order over to Mr. Doolittle, one of the partners of Glenny, Monro
& Moll, as appears from Mr. Doolittle's testimony: "Q. What did
you do with the order? A .... I asked him (Balkin) how the
stock was quoted, and he told me .... It was quoted 35 bid, of-
fered at 36 .... He asked me if I thought that we could obtain
as large a block as 500 shares at a fiat price of 35 . I said that
'I did not know, that I would call the bankers and find out. Q.
Why did you do that? A. Because I knew that they originated
the deal, and I thought there was a likelihood of their having
stock at that time .... Q. You could get it on the Curb if there
was a block of 500 shares offered, I take it? A. Yes, but it had
that the manager of such an account might actually repurchase above the
"protected price" and still penalize the dealer if the market price fell below
the "protected price" during the sixty day period.
29 Record, pp. 150, 163.
30 Record, pp. 60, 142, 158, 175, 176.
31 Record, pp. 60, 74, 77, 142, 143, 187. The trial court found defendants
were so instructed. Record, p. 19. This finding was disapproved and re-
versed by the Appellate Division. Record, p. 205.
32 Record, p. 142.
s3 Record, p. 164.
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been traded in in 100 share lots only, and when a market is
quoted at 35 to 36 there is only 100 shares offered at 36 as a
rule.. .. Q. What was that conversation which you had with
them (office of Lisman) ? A. I asked for Mr. Chambers or Mr.
Traugott. Mr. Traugott came to the wire, and I stated to him
that I had an order for 500 shares of Consolidated Automatic
Merchandising preferred, and asked him if he had any stock to
offer. He left the 'phone for a moment, came back and stated
that the market was quoted 35 bid, offered at 36, and that he
could supply 500 shares at 351/2. 1 asked him if that was the
best he could do and he said yes, that was the last sale, and that
was the best that he could do. He further stated that if the stock
stayed off the market for a period of 60 days that we would
receive a dollar a share. I said 'All right, I will take the stock.' " 04
After the sale was confirmed to the plaintiff, he became sus-
picious that the stock had not been purchased on the Curb. "Late
that afternoon when the Evening News, which carries the finan-
cial reports, came out, I looked in there and saw listed 200 shares
of Camco preferred. The following morning I looked in the Buf-
falo Courier, a copy of which I have there, which showed 300
shares of Camco preferred having been dealt in on the Curb...
with a high- of 36 and a low of 351/2, and the last was 36 .... I
communicated with Mr. Balkin.... I told Mr. Balkin that I didn't
think they had bought this stuff on the Curb, this preferred
stock, and his reply was, 'What kind of a house did I think they
were, that of course they bought it there, and I should know
better than to say that to them.' ... I talked to him about this
two and three hundred share proposition that appeared in the
Buffalo newspapers, and I think he told me there were 700 shares
dealt in that way." 35 Mr. Balkin denied that he had ever told
the plaintiff this 500 shares had been bought on the Curb.,,
The Report of Sales of New York Curb Mcrket published by
Francis Emory Fitch, Inc., shows the following Camco preferred
trades appearing on the Curb tape on February 13, 1929:
10 a.m. to 1 p. Mn.
100 shares at 35%
100 shares at 36
1 P. m. to Close
200 shares at 35%
100 shares at 35%
100 shares at 35%
100 shares at 36
34 Record, pp. 165, 166, 167. The Appellate Division found that the stock
"could not have been purchased on said day at a better, that is, a lower
price." Record, p. 208.
35 Record, pp. 64, 65, 80.
36 Record, p. 140.
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The subsequent history of the transaction, as it appears from
the records, was that defendants refused to carry the stock on
margin and plaintiff sold some other securities to provide part
of the purchase price and made arrangements with a bank "to
take up the stock," paying the defendants the balance on the
purchase price.3 7 In addition, plaintiff experienced some difficulty
or delay in getting credit for a dividend on these 500 shares
while they were in the hands of defendants.:" Either from these
circumstances and plaintiff's suspicions as to the purchase or
the unfavorable market action of the stock, plaintiff made the
inquiries in New York previously referred to and consulted
counsel, by whom he was advised of his right to secure complete
information on the transaction from defendants.a He demanded
this information from defendants, and received an answer dated
August 20, 1929, stating that the 500 shares of Camco preferred
had been purchased from F. J. Lisman & Co. at a price of $17,-
500.00, which would be $35.50 a share40 A second letter, dated
August 23, stated, "Owing to an error inadvertently made by
one of our accountants, we desire to supplement the statement
sent to you August 20, 1929, by striking out Sub-division 5 and
stating in lieu thereof, the following:
5. The price at which the same was bought was $35.50 per share less 1
point concession, with the understanding that we were to protect the above
mentioned stock sold to you for the period of 60 days, reimbursing F. J.
Lisman & Co. the 1% per share allowed at the time of delivery should any
of the above stock be re-purchased in the open market at or below the price
of $35.50 per share" 41
As to Cameo, various news releases from June, 1928, to July,
1929, present the prospect of a remarkably favorable future for
the company. During the selling group period there were a num-
ber of these items.42 No items appeared in the Chronicle in
January, 1929, but with the start of secondary distribution, pre-
sumably, in February, more news appeared. 3 For example, there
was news of interests obtained in other companies, of further
installations of vending machines, the start of "Nation-Wide
Installation of 'Talking Robots' to Sell Groceries," and of a com-
bination for "international distribution of automatic salesmen."
April and May business was reported to be good, and then the
Chronicle of July 13 carried a report that June had been a record
3 Record, pp. 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 180.
38 Record, pp. 71, 72, 96, 97, 98, 141, 178.
M Record, pp. 70, 83, 85, 88. See N. Y. PEI'AL LAw (1913) § 957.
0 oRecord, pp. 70, 71, 196, 197.
41 Record, pp. 71, 198.
42 (1928) 127 CHR. 957, 1257, 1394, 1531, 2094, 2827.
43 (1929) 128 CH&n 734, 1234.
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month.4" Very shortly thereafter, in the July 27 Chronicle, how-
ever, it was reported that F. J. Lisman'had announced he would
temporarily accept the presidency of the company, that the con-
cern was in a good financial position, but that earnings for 1929
would not be as good as anticipated. 4* Prior to that time there
had been only one constructive admission of weakness, the in-
crease in the conversion ratio'of the preferred stock. About the
first of December, 1928, the preferred was made convertible into
22 shares of common per share of preferred at the option of
the holder until December 31, 1929.40 This may not have resulted
from a desire to reduce cumulative contingent charges on the
company, however, but from a desire to make the preferred stock
more attractive in the face of the selling of that issue. In August,
1929, however, the conversion ratio was further increased, from
2 1. to 7 : 1, and there seems little doubt but that this move
resulted from a desire to reduce contingent charges.4 7
It was not. until late in August, 1929, that the annual report
of the company for the year ending December 31, 1928, was pub-
lished in the Chronicle. It showed a deficit applicable to the
parent company of $161,676.48 About the end of August, it was
reported that the directors had taken no action on the preferred
dividend normally payable September 15.49 Then there was no
further news for nearly a year, until June, 1930, when the finan-
cial report for 1929 was published. The deficit applicable to the
parent company was given as $821,422.0 In November, 1930, it
was reported that a suit against the company by the Remington
Arms Company had been settled by private agreement.51 In May,
1931, the company reported a profit and loss deficit of $4,159,357,
at the close of 193052 Apparently the special conversion offer
to preferred stockholders expiring December 31, 1929, was ex-
tended to June 30, 1931, for the Chronicle of July 4, 1931,
reported that the offer to exchange stocks on a 6 : 1 ratio had
been extended to June 30, 1932.43
The following table presents the market action of the common
and preferred stocks for the period under consideration:
44 (1929) 128 CHR. 1912, 2636, 2814, 2999, 3357, 4162; (1929) 129 Cnin.
133, 286. '
45 (1929) 129 CHR. 637. 1
40 (1928) 127 CHH. 3096.
47 (1929) 129 CHE. 1129.
48 (1929) 129 CHFs 1288.
49 (1929) 129 CHn. 1447.
50 (1930) 130 CHR. 4056.
5 (1930) 131 CH. 3211.
52 (1931) 132 CHBS 4063.
53 (1931) 133 CHn. 127.
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34 See CHRONICLE, Bank and Quotation Supplements for 1923 etc. The
action in the Kinney case was commenced on Sept. 23, 1929. The case came
on for trial January 13, 1930. Opinion was rendered by the trial court
on Mar. 27, 1930 and judgment was entered and filed in favor of plaintiff
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"A gent"-"Principa V"
The Kinney case at once raises the question of the legal relation-
ship existing between customer and stockbroker and the stand-
ards of conduct and behavior the violation of which give rise to
rights and duties inter se.
It would seem that the placing of an order to buy or sell by
the customer and an indication to the customer by the broker
of his willingness to undertake to execute the order give rise to a
bilateral contract.5 The mutual promises are all implied in fact
being based on the common understanding of the parties, the
way in which such business is normally conducted, and the cus-
tom and usage of particular markets or exchanges. The details
of these promises may vary in light of the requirements of par-
ticular transactions, e. g., purchases on margins,"° but in general
they would appear to .be as follows:
The broker agrees to use reasonable effort and care in attempt-
ing to find purchasers for or sellers of the security, which the
customer wants to sell or buy, at the price stated by the cus-
tomer; and if such purchasers or sellers are available, to sell
to or buy from such persons at the price indicated by the cus-
tomer; and to remit the price in case of sale, and deliver to the
customer the securities required, in case of purchase.Y
on May 16, 1930. The case was argued before the Appellate Division, Nov.
26, 1930, and judgment of reversal rendered on January 7, 1931. That
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals Oct. 20, 1931.
55 See Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235 (1869). Cf. Norton, A Simple
Purchase and Sale Through A Stockbroker (1895) 8 HARV. L. REv. 435, 443
et seq., for the view that the contract is unilateral. The difficulty is sug-
gested that an offer for a bilateral contract must be accepted and that.
acceptance must be communicated; that therefore where a customer at a
distance writes the broker to buy a specified number of shares at a price
stated and the broker does not reply there is no bilateral contract. While
it is true that acceptance in bilateral contracts requires communication
[WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 70] nevertheless silence and inaction may
amount to assent [WILLISTON, op. Ct. §§ 91 et seq.]. Accordingly if the
customer had been customarily dealing with the broker by correspondence
and the practice had been for the broker to undertake to execute the order
without communicating with the customer until the sale or purchase had
been consummated it might well be held that such silence constituted an
acceptance. Cf. Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193, 9 Sup. Ct. 335 (1880);
MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES (1931) § 44. At
least it would seem to be a question for the jury. The rights of the broker
against the customer therefore might not be altered whether the contract is
bilateral or unilateral. Cf. McDonald v. Boenig, 43 Mich. 394, 5 N. W. 439
(1880) (real estate "agent"). Obviously the same is not true as respects
the rights of the customer against the broker.
56 See Markham v. Jaudon, supra note 55; Guthrie and Tenney, Somo
Legal Problems Connected with Stock Market Transactions (1930) 29 Mi l,
L. REv. 41, 58; MEYER, op. cit. supra note 55, at 312, et seq.; Dos PASSOS,
STOCK-BROKERS AND STOCK-ExCHANGES (2d ed. 1905) c. III.
5 Wahl v. Tracy, 139 Wis. 668, 121 N. W. 660 (1909); Isham v. Post,
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The customer, on the other hand, agrees on performance by
the broker to pay him the commission which is reasonable or
normally required for such purchases or sales or which is speci-
fied under the rules of a particular exchange s Further, he
promises to take the shares so ordered and to pay the broker
the price," or in case of a sale to deliver the shares sold.
The legal consequences of the agreement are for the most part
well defined. Thus, on purchasing the stock or bonds as ordered,
the broker may sue the customer for the price -9 and his com-
mission. If he does not use reasonable care and diligence in
attempting to execute the order he may be held liable in damages
to the customer.2
-
141 N. Y. 100, 35 N. E. 1084 (1894), s. c., 167 N. Y. 531, 60 N. E. 1113
(1901); Sledge & Norfleet Co. v. Mann, 166 Ark. 358, 266 S. W. 264 (1924).
And see MIEYER, op. cit. supra note 55, at § 47; Packham v. Ketchum, 5
Bosw. 506, 513 (N. Y. 1859). On discretionary accounts see Cohen v. Roths-
child, 182 App. Div. 408, 169 N. Y. Supp. 659 (1918) ; MEYEE op. cit. supra
note 55, at § 62. The requirement that the broker use due skill and care is
frequently referred to as if it arose out of his relationship as "agent" to the
customer and was superimposed on the contract that was made. Cf. Mmnmn,
op. cit. supra note 55, at §§ 39, 40, 47. In imposing this requirement, how-
ever, it does not seem that courts are first establishing a "relationship" and
then out of the thin air of "ought" and "should" making duties. Rather, it
seems that the requirement of due skill and care is spelled out from the
usual implied in fact agreement or understanding of the parties. One se-
lecting another to do an act for him determines the choice at least in part
in light of his reliability and integrity.
r See Rubino v. Scott, 118 N. Y. 662, 23 N. E. 1103 (1839); Briggs v.
Boyd, 56 N. Y. 289 (1874); C. C. Jones Investment Co. v. Lowrey, 99 Kan.
87, 160 Pac. 999 (1916) ; MEYER, op. cit. sZpra note 55, at § 113; Dos PASSOS,
op. cit. supra note 56, at 394 et seq. As to the effect of the rules of the stock
exchange see generally MEYER, op. cit. supra note 55, at § 2T; Dos PAssos,
op. cit. supra note 56, c. IV; Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 13 Sup. CL 930
(1893) ; Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U. S. 461, 21 Sup. Ct. 845 (1901) ; MEcHE,
AGENcY (2d ed. 1914) §§ 2393 et seq. See also infra note 113.
59 The result is frequently referred to as as the broker's right to indemnity
and reimbursement. Knapp v. Simon, 96 N. Y. 284 (1884). Or the relation-
ship is described as that of creditor-debtor. Markham v. Jaudon, supra note
55; Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 512 (1908); Skiff v.
Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 26 Atl. 874 (1893).
60 See, e.g., Knapp v. Simon, supra note 59.
01 See supra note 58; MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 58, §§ 2424 et seq.
62 See supra note 57; Minnear v. Gay, 217 Mass. 403, 104 N. E. 961
(1914); and see Liberman v. McDonnell, 97 Cal. App. 171, 275 Pac. 486
(1929). But he is not liable for the negligence of intermediate agencies
such as the delay of the transfer agent in transferring the share to the
customer. Eddy v. Schiebel, 112 Conn. 248, 152 AtL 66 (1930). See LIEcHEM,
op. cit. supra note 58, § 2410. Similarly, the customer may sue for money
had and received where the purchases effected were fictitious. Todd v.
Bishop, 136 Mass. 386 (1884); Prout v. Chisolm, 21 App. Div. 54, 47 N. Y.
Supp. 376 (1897). And see Pugh v. Moore, 44 La. Ann. 209, 10 So. 710
(1892).
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Out of this contractual arrangement the courts 3 state that the
following relationships arise: (1) In executing the order the
broker is acting as "agent" for the customer. (2) In advancing
the price to acquire or carry the securities he is a "creditor."
(3) In holding the securities until reimbursed or paid by the
customer he is a "pledgee." 64 The second and third represent
execution by the broker of his undertaking under the bilateral
contract; in other words are incidents of that performance. Here
we are primarily interested in the first. The term "agent" is
used to describe many varying incidents of the contract. Thus
it differentiates the promise to take and pay or, on the other
hand, to deliver from the promise by the broker which, as we
have seen, is to use reasonable efforts to find purchasers or
sellers at the stated price.65 This absence of definite commitment
has important consequences. For example, it results in relieving
the broker of liability for the price of stock sold, where, before
delivery, the purchaser defaults.26 This follows even though on
63 See Markham v. Jaudon, supra note 55; Richardson v. Shaw, supra
note 59; Skiff v. Stoddard, supra note 59; MEYER, op. cit. supra note 55,
§ 41.
6 The issue frequently arises on the bankruptcy of the broker where the
customer seeks to reclaim the securities from a marginal account. See cases
supra note 59; Guthrie and Tenney, op. cit. supra note 56; Oppenheimer,
Rights and Obligations of Customers in Stockbrokerage Bankruptcies
(1924) 37 HAuv. L. REv. 860. Or where the customer sues in conversion
alleging sale by the broker without notice. Covell v. Loud, 135 Mass. 41
(1883); Markham v. Jaudon, supra note 55. And see Horton v. Morgan, 19
N. Y. 170 (1859). Or where the broker sues for the price, the customer's
defense being that the delay of the transfer agent is imputable to plaintiff.
Eddy v. Schiebel, supra note 62.
For the minority view that the relation of pledgor-pledgee is not created
see Covell v. Loud, supra; Weston v. Jordan, 168 Mass. 401, 47 N. E. 133
(1897) ; Chase v. Boston, 180 Mass. 458, 62 N. E. 1059 (1902) (broker
liable for tax' as "owners"). See MEHEMa, op. cit. supra note 58, §§ 2385 ct
seq.; and Note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 1258. It has been held that where the
contract between customer and broker-was that of vendee-vendor, without
more, the rule as to pledges does not apply. Sackville v. Wimer, 16 Colo.
519, 233 Pac. 152 (1925).
65 Liberman v. McDonnell, supra note 62; Crusius v. Loucheim, 132 Misc.
520, 230 N. Y. Supp. 218 (1928). And see Ackerman v. Dick, 143 App. Div.
310, 128 N. Y. Supp. 603 (1911).
,o Liberman v. McDonnell, supra note 62; Crusius v. Loucheim, supra note
65. Likewise the broker is not liable to the customer for delay in trans-
ferring the stock to the customer so as to make it available for delivery
where such delay was due to the negligence of the transfer agent. Eddy v.
Schiebel, supra note 62. And see Peckham v. Ketchum, supra note 57, where
an action by customer against broker to recover back the purchase price was
disallowed. The certificate issued and delivered to plaintiff did not repro-
sent actual stock and was valueless. Defendants exercised good faith and
there was no evidence of lack of diligence on their part, In rendering
judgment for defendants the court said (p. 512) : "A party who deals with
another, or employs another avowedly as an agent, to make a contract with
[Vol. 41
SECONDARY DISTRIBUTION
the contract which the broker has made with the purchaser
(usually another broker) the broker is liable as promisor (or
"principal") by the rules of the common law or by rules and regu-
lations of the stock exchange. 67 No quarrel can be had with this
result, since, within the fictitious four corners of the implied in
fact contract, the broker does not purport to guarantee sales or
to act as del credere "agent." The same result follows even
though, prior to repudiation by the purchaser, the broker has
confirmed the sale by memorandum stating "sold for your
account and risk," such confirmation being read in light of the
broker's commitment under the contract with the customer.3
"Agent" is thus used to describe here, as in other situations,o
the nature and scope of the promise for which the bargain was
made.
some one who he consents shall remain unknown at the time, cannot have a
better right against the agent than if the principal had then been dis-
closed." And again (p. 513): "I do not think that the employment of the
defendants ... can justly be treated as an employment to purchase genuine
stock, to the extent and import of making them guarantors of the validity
of that which they should purchase. It was rather to purchase what in the
market was passing as stock of this description. . . . Then the rule of
indemnity to the agent when the principal is a seller, involves the exemption
of the agent from responsibility, when, under similar Urcumstances, the
principal is the purchaser.
"Again, an agent employed to purchase a commodity of a particular
character or quality, is only bound to use all the circumspection and dili-
gence which a prudent purchaser himself would exercise."
67Crusius 'v. Loucheim, supra note 65; Liberman v. McDonnell, a,.pra
note 62.
6sLiberman v. McDonnell, supra note 62; Crusius v. Loucheim, -upra
note 65. In Liberman v. McDonnell the court said, 97 Cal. App. at 178, 275
Pac. at 489: "Undisputed evidence shows that according to these rules [New
York Curb Market] members deal with one another as principals, and
such is the general rule among brokers in transactions on the floor of the
exchange, their principals not being disclosed.... This, however, does not
change the relation between the broker and his principal. As to the latter
he is still an agent.. . and the effect of the above rule or custom, which
was designed to facilitate the business of the exchange, is not to constitute
the broker a purchaser from his principal." And see Knapp v. Simon, supra.
note 59, holding that as respects the broker's right of indemnity or reim-
bursement from the customer it is immaterial that in the same tranaction
he may have been regarded by certain parties as the "principal in the
transaction."
69 The nature of the performance promised by a promisor is frequently
tested in terms of "agent" or "independent contractor," "agent" or Ivendor"
etc. Thus in Lawrence Fertig Co., Inc. v. Klein, 135 Misc. 547, 239 N. Y.
Supp. 96 (1930), plaintiff, an advertising agency, sued a customer for the
amount of advertising furnished, which plaintiff was required to pay on
defendant's behalf. The defense was that defendant's advertisement had not
been placed in the number of publications agreed upon. In reversing judg-
ment for defendant the court ruled that if plaintiff was defendant's "agent"
plaintiff was entitled to recover justifiable expenditures; that if plaintiff
agreed absolutely to publish defendant's advertising, then plaintiff was an
1932]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Other meanings of the term "agent" might be mentioned. But
the one which is of most importance in fhe analysis of the instant
case relates to fiduciary duty. One employed to buy or sell for an-
other is chosen for his skill, discretion and honesty. Fees are paid
for brains and integrity, and the exercise of prudent judgment.
Accordingly an "agent" employed to sell his employer's property
may not purchase it himself without full disclosure to the em-
ployer. The latter may avoid the sale on such showing even
though there were no actual fraud, the price fair and the bargain
as good as or even better than could be obtained elsewhere. 0 Or
he may affirm the transaction and sue for damages which may be
nominal or actual, and if the latter, they may be measured in
terms of secret profits to the "agent." 71 Conversely the "agent"
"independent contractor" and the failure of substantial performance was a
defense. Similarly in De Bavier v. Funke, 66 Hun 633, 21 N. Y. Supp. 410
(1892), affd, 142 N. Y. 633, 37 N. E. 566 (1894), commission merchants
and importers sued to recover damages for failure to accept and pay for a
quantity of silk purchased for defendant by plaintiffs. The defense, inter
*alia, was that the purchase was from plaintiffs, that plaintiffs were acting
as "principals" and therefore were liable on the guaranty to furnish silk of
a certain quality. The jury was given the determination of the question, If
plaintiffs were "agents" for defendant, they were under a duty to use
reasonable care in 'carrying out their orders and would not be liable if they
used such care. Judgment for plaintiffs was affirmed. And see Stevenson,
Jaques, & Co. v. McLean, 5 Q. B. D. 346 (1880) and cases infra notes 87, 88,
dealing with liability of "agents" and brokers as promisors on the con-
tracts they make.
The issue also arises between manufacturer (or wholesaler)"and retailer
in determination of whether the .contract is one of "agency" or "sale," as
where the goods in possession of the retailer are destroyed by fire and he is
sued for the price, the defense being "agency" or "bailment" [Kingman Plow
Co. v. Joyce, 194 Mo. App. 367, 184 S. W. 490 (1916) ; B. F. Sturtevant Co.
v. Cumberland Dugan & Co., 106 Md. 587, 68 Atl. 351 (1907) (del credere
"agent" under no obligation to insure)]; or where in a suit for the price
the retailer defends that he was under no definite commitment to take and
pay. W. T. Rawleigh Medical Co. v. Holcomb, 126 Ark. 597, 191 S. W. 215
(1917). Cf. Olsen v. Hoffman, 175 "Minn. 287, 221 N. W. 10 (1928).
70 Hall v. Paine, 224 Mass. 62, 112 N. E. 153 (1916) ; Maxwell v. Bates,
239 Ky. 600, 40 S. W. (2d) 304 (1931) (where "agent" employed auctioneer
and at public auction "without reserve or bid" bid in the property) ; People
v. Township, 11 Mich. 222 (1863) ; Meek v. Hurst, 223 Mo. 688, 122 S. W.
1022 (1909); Rich v. Black, 173 Pa. St. 92, 33 Atl. 880 (1896); and Note
(1929) 62 A. L. R. 63. A fortiori where there is evidence of unfairness or
fraud. Kiene v. Brownell, 29 Ohio App. 281, 163 N. E. 51 (1927); Green-
field Savings Bank v. Simons, 133 Mass. 415 (1882). See generally MAEGII.M,
op. cit. supra note 58, §§ 1198 et seq. The opposite result is reached where
there has been full disclosure. Stauch v. Daniels, 240 Mich. 295, 215 N. W.
311 (1927).
For the distinction between actions on a rescission anj actions for a
rescission, see Heckscher v. Edenborn, 203 N. Y. 210, 96 N. E. 441 (1911) ;
Vail v. Reynolds, 118 N. Y. 297, 23 N. E. 301 (1890). See generally on
rescission 4 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 55, cc. XL, XLI.
71 Bain v. Brown, 56 N. Y. 285 (1874); Merriam v. Johnson, 86 Mlinn. 01,
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employed to purchase may not without full disclosure sell "his
own" property. And if he does the legal consequences are the
same as where he purchases for himself.-2 His fiduciary duty is
also held to be breached and the voidability of the transaction
established where the sale, for example, is to a corporation of
which the "agent" is the controlling stockholder.5
Analogous problems of dual positions have consistently re-
ceived the same treatment at the hands of courts. Thus where one
employed to buy or sell accepts a commission, without full dis-
closure, from the other party to the transaction, he may not
recover his commission from his first employer. 4 Further, the
contract may be rescinded or a defense successfully interposed
if it is sought to b enforced.75 And the dual capacity of- the
90 N. W. 116 (1902) ; McNutt v. Dix, 83 Mich. 328, 47 N. W. 212 (1890).
Cf. Whitehead v. Lynn, 20 Colo. App. 51, 76 Pac. 1119 (1904). See gener-
ally 2 PoEmmoY, EQuIy JURISpRUDENCE (3d ed. 1905) § 959. And some-
times the commission may also be recovered. (1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 201.
72 Friesenhahn v. Bushnell, 47 Minn. 443, 50 N. W. 597 (1891) ; Tewks-
bury v. Spruance, 75 Ill. 187 (1874) ; Montgomery v. Hundley, 205 Mo. 138,
103 S. W. 527 (1907); Armstrong v. Jackson, [1917] 2 K. B. 822; Gillett v.
Peppercorne, 3 Beav. 78 (1840) ; Fardy v. Buckley, 231 Mass. 377, 121 N. E.
77 (1918). See MECHEMi, op. cit. supra note 58, § 1205. The same rule ap-
plies to joint adventurers. Heckscher v. Edenborn, supra note 70.
'1 Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 154 N. E. 303 (1926) (sole stockholder
though beneficial interest was in another); Roy Realty Co., Inc. v. Burk-
hardt, 146 Miss. 270, 111 So. 289 (1927) (as against defense that, since
employer said to "sell for $10,500 or $10,000 net to me," the "agent" could
keep all the excess); Newell-Murdoch Realty Co. v. Wickham, 183 Cal. 39,
190 Pac. 359 (1920). Likewise where the purchase was made through a
"strawman." Nagle v. McCoy, 94 N. J. Eq. 790, 121 Atl. 705 (192); Eu-
neau v. Rieger, 105 Mo. 659, 78 S. W. 1042 (1891). Or from a "strawman."
Payne v. Adams, 133 Kan. 643, 3 Pac. (2d) 630 (1931).
7 4Little v. Phipps, 208 Mass. 331, 94 N. E. 260 (1911); Erland v. Gib-
bons, 176 App. Div. 552, 163 N. Y. Supp. 582 (1917); Everhart v. Searle,
71 Pa. 256 (1872). And see Young v. Hughes, 32 N. J. Eq. 372 (1880). The
opposite result is reached where both parties have given assent to the agent
acting in such dual capacity. Bell v. McConnell, 37 Ohio St. 396 (1881). See
generally MECHEAM, op. cit. supra note 58, §§ 1206, 1207; Note (1891) 12
L. R. A. 395; Comment (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 799; Note (1927) 48 . L. R.
917. Cf. Larson v. Thoma, 143 Iowa 338, 121 N. W. 1059 (1909).
75Balto Sugar Refining Co. v. Campbell and Zell Co., 83 Md. 36, 34 Atl. 369
(1896) (rescission); Alger v. Anderson, 78 Fed. 729 (C. C. N. D. Tenn.
1897) (rescission); Smith v. Sorby, 3 Q. B. D. 552 (1878) (damages breach
of contract); Yeoman v. Lasley, 40 Ohio St. 190 (1883) (rescission; joint
adventure); Kelsey v. New Eng. Street Ry., 62 N. J. Eq. 742, 43 At]. 1001
(1901) (specific performance); Panama & South Pacific Tel. Co. v. India
R., G. P. & T. Works Co., L. R. 10 Ch. App. 515 (1875) (rescission); City
v. Pertz, 66 Fed. 427 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895) (action for price); Carr v. Nat.
Bank & Loan Co., 167 N. Y. 375, 60 N. E. 649 (1901) (rescission).
While the innocent vendor may not be liable in an action for damages for
fraud of his agent, he may be liable in rescission on the theory that he can-
not retain the benefits of the agent's fraudulent act. Kennedy v. McKay, 43
N. J. L. 288 (1881) ; Ellison v. Stockton, 185 Ia. 979, 170 N. W. 435 (1919).
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"agent" is ground for recovery from him of his compensation."
The only exception to these rules governing dual "agents" is the
case where the "agent" does nothing more than bring buyer and
seller together and having done that steps out of the picture com-
pletely77 The bargain then is made without his further interven-
tion. The negotiations are not subject to the direct or subtle
pressure of his participation and persuasion.
Exactly the same results obtain when the stockbroker assumes
a dual or adverse position without full disclosure to his customer
and proceeds to act as "principal," or as "agent" for another.'
Thus, if a customer directs the stockbroker to "sell" and the
broker, without disclosure, "purchases" for "his own" account,
the transaction may be avoided 70 or damages recovered80 And
76 Cannell v. Smith, 142 Pa. 25, 21 Atl. 793 (1891) (no error to exclude
evidence that sale price was higher than value of the property) ; Jansen v.
Williams, 36 Neb. 869, 55 N. W. 279 (1893). And in Andrews v. Ramsay
& Co., [1903] 2 K. B. 635, the "principal" was allowed to recover not only
the commission he had paid the "agent" but also the latter's secret commis-
sion. The court said (p. 637): "It is impossible to gauge in any way what
the plaintiff has lost by the improper conduct of the defendants."
77 Knauss v. Gottfried Krueger Brewing Co., 142 N. Y. 70, 36 N. E. 867
(1894) ; Green v. Robertson, 64 Cal. 75, 28 Pac. 446 (1883) ; Pollatselk v.
Goodwin, 17 Misc. 587, 40 N. Y. Supp. 682 (1896) (middleman). And see
Ranney v. Donovan, 78 Mich. 318, 44 N. W. 276 (1889).
'S The same exceptions, noted above, respecting instances where the broker
acts merely as an instrumentality or intermediary bringing together buyer
and seller, may apply to the stockbroker. For example, the rules of the Now
York Curb Market, governing dealings upon the floor of the exchange, pro-
vide by c. I, § 13 that: "When a member has an order to buy and an order
to sell the same security, he must offer such security at the minimum frac-
tion of trading above his bid price or bfd the minimum fraction of trading
below his offered price before making a transaction with himself." The
Rules of the New York Stock E'xchange (c. I, § 13) provide similarly, ex-
cept that the original offer must be 1a higher than the bid. A transaction
on the exchange governed by such rules is valid and gives neither customer
any claim against the broker based on the duality of his position. Hall v.
Paine, supra note 70; Terry v. Birmingham Nat. Bank, 99 Ala. 566, 13 So.
149 (1892). And see Cohen v. Rothschild, 182 App. Div. 408, 169 N. Y.
Supp. 659 (1918); In re Brown, 185 Fed. 766 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910).
The supervision provided and the presence of representatives of other po-
tential buyers and sellers on the floor of a recognized exchange guarantee
the integrity of such transactions consummated in those places. It does not
necessarily follow that over-the-counter transactions are afforded any such
protection, though it is possible for a broker to act in perfect good faith
and to provide sufficient publicity to the transaction so as to safeguard It
similarly.
As to fictitious sales see Haight v. Haight & Freese Co., 112 App. Div.
475, 98 N. Y. Supp. 471 (1906), aff'd, 190 N. Y. 540, 83 N. E. 1126 (1907);
Cook v. Flagg, 251 Fed. 5 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); Smith v. New York Stock
& Produce Clearing House Co., 70 Hun 597, 25 N. Y. Supp. 261 (1893);
Todd v. Bishop, supra note 62; Prout v. Chisolm, supra note 62.
79 Tatsuno v. Kasai, 70 Utah 203, 259 Pac. 318 (1927); Rothschild v.
Brookman, 5 Bligh. (N. R.) 165 (1831), aff'g 3 Sim. 153 (1829) ; Wlsboy v.
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if the customer instructs him to "purchase" and he "purchases"
"his own" securities for the customer similar consequences fol-
low. 1 The damages may be merely nominals '2 In allowing res-
Alan Shepard & Co. Inc., 268 Mlass. 21, 167 N. E. 334 (1929). In Armstrong
v. Jackson, supra note 72, where the customer was rescinding a purchase
of shares from the broker the court admitted that the rule in England was
that in executed transactions rescission will lie only for "fraud." Seddon
v. North Eastern Salt Co., [1905] 1 Ch. 326. But the court held that where
there was a fiduciary duty the rule is "infinitely stricter and more severe"
and that rescission would He even though the broker sells or purchases at
the market and acts without intent to defraud.
SO Tatsuno v. Kasai, supra note 79; Mlayo v. Knowlton, 134 N. Y. 250, 01
N. E. 985 (1892). On learning the facts the customer may tender back and
demand the shares sold and treat the refusal as a conversion and recover
damages measured by the "difference between the market prices of the stock
at the date of the alleged sale and the market prices on the date of tender."
Stiebel v. Lissberger, 166 App. Div. 164, 151 N. Y. Supp. 822 (1915), aff'd,
222 N. Y. 604, 118 N. E. 1078 (1918). The broker contended that the meas-
ure of damages was the difference between the price which the broker paid
and the market price at that time, and since the purchase in question was
at the market there were no damages. The court said (p. 169) that to apply
such rule "would be to require the customer to forego his privilege of elec-
tion, upon discovery of the facts, whether to adopt or to disavow the un-
authorized act of his brokers, and to compel him to accept and ratify their
unlawful act. The practical efficacy of the rule forbidding a broker to deal
himself with his customers' property would be wholly destroyed."
Though the right to rescind may be lost by laches, the right to sue for
damages for fraud might still remain. McNulty v. Whitney, 273 Mass. 494,
174 N. E. 121 (1930).
s 1Marye v. Strouse, 5 Fed. 483 (C. C. Nev. 1880) ; Oelkers v. Ellis, [1914]
2 K. B. 139; Armstrong v. Jackson, gupra note 72; Rothschild v. Brookman,
supra note 79; Wisbey v. Alan Shepard & Co. Inc., supra note 79; Blayo v.
Knowlton, supra note 80; Tetley v. Shand, 25 L. T. 658 (1871) (cotton
brokers). And see Levy v. Loeb, 85 N. Y. 365 (1881), s. c., 89 N. Y. 387
(1882) ; Conkey v. Bond, 36 N. Y. 426 (1867) ; IHE51, op. cit. supra note
58, §§ 2411 et seq.
Though the right to rescind may be lost by laches there is no election to
affirm the transaction unless all material facts are known at the time. Thus
a sale of part of the stock acquired by the customer is not necessarily an
election barring a suit to rescind as to the stock still held. MeNulty v.
Whitney, supra note 80. But if the customer intends to rely upon rescission
he must return or offer to return the property within a reasonable time
after he has gained knowledge of the facts which give him a right to
rescind. Ibid.
S2 McNulty v. Whitney, supra note 80. The customer had sold part of the
stock which the brokers had sold him from their "own" holdings. He did
not sue to recover secret profits made by defendants in selling their "own"
stock but based his claim on his own losses. He alleged in addition to the
sale of defendants' stock fraudulent misrepresentations as to the value of
the stock. The trial court left it to the jury to determine the damages
arising as the "natural consequence" of defendants' fraud. No distinction
was made in-the charge between defendants' breach of fiduciary duty and
their fraudulent misrepresentations. This charge was held to be error, the
court ruling that plaintiff's loss for breach of fiduciary duty was not the loss
incurred by him when he sold the shares. The damages should be measured
19321 971
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cission it is immaterial whether plaintiff suffered damage by rea-
son of the transaction. As once stated by the Court of Appeals
of New York, "It i§ no answer that the intention was honest and
that the brokers did better for their principal by selling him their
own stock than they could have done by going into the open mar-
ket. The rule is inflexible, and although its violation in the par-
ticular case caused no damage to the principal, he cannot be com-
pelled to adopt the purchase." 11 That case involved a suit by the
broker against the customer, but the same result follows where
the customer is repudiating the transaction and seeking to be
restored to his former position .
4
Another way of stating the result is that an "agent" without
full disclosure cannot acquire an independent, adverse interest to
his employer and thus deprive him of the benefit of disinterested
advice and the impartial exercise of discretion, the very things
for which presumably he was employed. If he does he becomes a
"principal" in the transaction as well as an "agent" for his em-
ployer. The courts have refused to admit that the average indi-
vidual could stand the stress and strain of such dual position.
As Mr. Justice Cardozo recently said: "Only by this uncompro-
mising rigidity has the rule of undivided loyalty been maintained
against disintegrating erosion." s1
In light of these well established and somewhat elementary
rules of law what disposition should be made of the Kinney case?
Did defendants "own" the stock which plaintiff purchased? What
sort of independent or adverse interest is sufficient to constitute
the broker a "principal" or an "agent" for another?
First as to the word "own." It is obvious that it has no fixed
meaning. Or, to put it another way, it has such broad meaning
and so many legal connotations that it acquires content only when
related to particularized and closely drawn issues. It and its com-
panion "title" mean so much they mean little. "Own" as well as
"title" might be translated into terms of certain types of com-
by the difference between what he paid and what on the day of the purchase
he could have sold the stock for in the market. Accord: Waddell v. Blockey,
4 Q. B. D. 678 (1879). If unable to prove actual damages, he could recover
nominal damages for breach of the fiduciary duty. As to damages for fraud-
ulent misrepresentations the measure is the difference between what plaintiff
received and what its value would have been if the stock had been as repre-
sented. Cf. Whitehead v. Lynn, supra, note 71.
83 Taussig v. Hart, 58 N. Y. 425, 428 (1874). See also Tewksbury v.
Spruance, supra note 72; Tetley v. Shand, supra note 81 (cotton brokers).
84 Marye v. Strouse, oupra note 81; Armstrong v. Jackson, supra note 71.
Of course, even though the relation of vendor-vendee exists between cus-
tomer and broker rather than "principal" and "agent," the broker may be
liable in deceit. But the requirements of that cause of action are quite
different and more exacting than damages or rescission for breach of fiduci-
ary duty. Taylor v. Guest, supra note 54.
85 Wendt v. Fischer, supra note 73, at 444, 154 N. E. at 804.
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mitments or risks. They may be descriptive of the result reached
in deciding, e. g., who bears the risk of destruction, deterioration,
or fall in price; who must pay the taxes; who has the right to
possession; who has the right or power of disposition; who is
entitled to the income.so They are descriptive of ends reached
rather than toolsluseful in analysis. They are the jokers in the
court's pack of cards which, if played, invariably take the trick.
The complaint in the Kinney case was drawn on the theory that
defendants were selling their "own" stock. Defendants asserted
they were not. The Appellate Division summarily dismissed this
issue in the following language: "The taking of a secret profit by
a broker does not make him in law the purchaser of the stock or
committed therefor, at least so far as his customer is concerned.
. . . The incident does not change the transaction from one of
the execution of an order by a broker for his client to one of the
sale to the broker individually, and thu.s to a sale by the brokcr of
his own property to his customer." (Italics ours.) The vague
"his" and the undefined "own" give the impression of concepts,
standardized and simple, easily recognized and readily proved.
But it is submitted that both the form and substance of the
transaction negative such simplicity in meaning.
It is clear, however, that defendants had not paid for and re-
ceived possession of the stock before plaintiff gave his order.
Nor were they at that time under any commitment to take and
pay for any of those shares. Furthermore, so far as appears,
they had no option, paid for or otherwise, to acquire such shares
at a stated or determinable price. Measured in terms, then, of
right to possession, duty to take and pay, option to acquire, phys-
ical possession or any other criteria frequently thought of as
descriptive of "ownership" they were not "owners." To be sure,
on contracting for the shares with F. J. Lisman & Co. for the
purpose of filling plaintiff's order, they became obligated to F. J.
Lisman & Co. to take and pay. That would follow not only by
86 See analysis and collection of cases in LLEWELLYN, CASES AD M,A-
TERIALS ON SALES (1930) bk. II, c. VI. The examples, particularly through-
out the law of sales, are numerous. Somewhat typical of their disutility are
the cases involving whether there has been an "agency" or "sale" on the
distribution or marketing of goods from manufacturer or wholesaler to re-
tailer. Thus the issue may be the liability for taxes assessed on the inven-
tory or on sales [D. Al. Ferry & Co. v. Hall, 188 Ala. 178, 66 So. 104 (1914) ;
Commonwealth v. Thorne, Neale & Co., 264 Pa. 408, 107 Atl. 814 (1919);
Fred Harvey, Inc. v. Crooks, 39 F. (2d) 466 (D. C. W. D. Mo., 1930)]; or
the liability of the manufacturer for the warranties or representations of
the retailer [Piper v. Oakland Motor Co., 94 Vt. 211, 109 Atl. 911 (1920));
or the liability of the retailer for the price of goods unsold [see cases supra
note 69]; or the right of the manufacturer to reclaim the goods or impose
a trust on the proceeds of their sale in the bankruptcy or insolvency of the
retailer [Ex parte White, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 397 (1871); Arbuckle Bros. v.
Gates, 95 Va. 802, 30 S. E. 496 (1898)]; or the validity of the marketing
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virtue of the rules of the exchange 81 (were it an exchange trans-
action) but also by the law which holds liable on the promise the
party who makes it, whether in fact he is "agent" of another,
or himself the "principal." 85 The fact that someone else, such
as an unnamed or undisclosed "principal," may also be liable 11
does not narrow the choice or change the bargain of the other
contracting party.90 But the liability of the defendants for the
purchase price would likewise exist even if they had not pur-
chased from F. J. Lisman & Co. but had executed the transaction
on the Curb. Having made a promise they would be liable on it."
So the fact that in the instant case they contract to buy in their
own name is per se of no weight whatsoever in making them
"owners." Such liability is the normal incident of the usual
device under the anti-trust laws. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376 (1911); U. S. v. General Electric Co,, 272
U. S. 476, 47 Sup Ct. 192 (1926). For a critical analysis of the "agency"
-"sale" concepts, see Klaus, Sale, Agency and Price Malintenanco (1928)
28 COL. L. Ray. 312, 441. For further cases see DOUGLAS AND SMANICS, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LOSSES AND ASSETS (1932) Pt. I. c. I.
87 Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, c. I, § 7 provide: "When
written contracts shall have been exchanged the signers thereof only are
liable." C. I, § 14 provides: "No party to a contract shall be compelled
to accept a substitute principal, unless the name proposed to be substi-
tuted shall be declared in making the bid or offer and as a part thereof."
The same provisions are to be found in the Rules of the New York Curb
Market, C. I, § 7 (e), 14. And see cases infra, note 145.
ss See Brown v. Bradlee, 156 Mass. 28, 30 N. E. 85 (1892) ; Whitney v.
Wyman, 101 U. S. 392 (1879); Universal Steam Nay. Co. Ltd. v. James
McKelvie & Co., [1923] A. C. 492; Solomon v. N. J. Indemnity Co., 94
N. J. L. 318, 110 Atl. 813 (1920). Thus a commission merchant is liable
for breach of warranty where the existence but not the identity of his
principal was known. Argersinger v. Macnaughton, 114 N. Y. 535, 21
N. E. 1022 (1889). And see Pugh v. Moore, supra note 62. In the normal
transaction where the broker purchases or sells on the exchange or over-
the-counter or from or to a dealer the name of his "principal" is not
disclosed. Thus normally there would not arise the questions involved in
such cases as Hurricane Milling Co. v. Steel & Payne Co., 84 W. Va, 376,
99 S. E. 490 (1919); Barlow v. Congregational Society, 8 Allen 460 (Mass.
1864); Calder v. Dobell, L. R. 6 C. P. 486 (1871); Higgins v. Senior, 8
M. & W. 834 (1841); and Heffron v. Pollard, 73 Tex. 96, 11 S. W. 165
(1889), where by the form of the contract and the disclosure of the iden-
tity of the "principal" the defense by the "agent" is that he did not make
the promise but that the promisee looked to the credit and performanco
of the "principali" And see cases infra note 146,
89 Watteau v. Fenwick, [1893] 1 Q. B. 346; Hubbard v. Tenbrooh, 124
Pa. 291, 16 At. 817 (1889); Brooks v. Shaw, 197 Iass. 376, 84 N. 1-1.
110 (1908).
0 Except, of course, on an election of remedies Nwhich bars proceeding
against both, as to which see Old Ben Coal Co. v. Universal Coal Co., 248
Mich. 486, 227 N. W. 794 (1929) ; Barrell v. Newby, 127 Fed, 656 (C. C. A.
7th, 1904); North Carolina Lumber Co. v. Spear Motor Co., 192 N. C.
377, 135 S. E. 115 (1926).
91 See supra note 87.
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transaction consummated by brokers, not a distinguishing char-
acteristic of the type which courts strike down.
There are at least three other considerations which make the
result reached by the Appellate Division doubtful. First, if de-
fendants had anticipated that some customer would buy Camco
stock, had given an order to F. 3. Lisman & Co. and it had been
confirmed even less than one minute before plaintiff's order was
placed, there is no doubt that then they would have been selling
their "own" stock to plaintiff so as to come within the prohibi-
tions of the law described above 2- Is one rule of law to be made
for merchants who carry an inventory; another for merchants
who do not, but yet act as merchants? 93
Secondt, the Kinney case is to be distinguished from one in
which an "agent" merely fails to reveal the actual price at which
he purchased, having purchased in the place and manner e-plicit
or implicit in the contract. In the case of Sutro v. Jacobson,0 '
92A1 of the cases which have been found, including those cited supra
notes 78-84, involve situations where at the time of the placing of the
arder by the customer the broker had acquired the securities and was
carrying them in his portfolio or stood committed for them on subscrip-
tion or underwriting.
93 Other issues might arise which would test defendants' relation to the
stock. (1) Would there be a stamp tax under federal or state laiw oan the
transaction between F. J. Lisman & Co. and defendants as well as on the
transfer to plaintiff? It is provided by Federal Revenue Act of 192G, § 800,
43 STAT. 331, 26 U. S. C. A. § 901:
. . . there shall be levied, collected, and paid, for and in respect of
the several bonds, debentures, or certificates of stock and of indebtedness,
and other documents, instruments, matters, and things mentioned and
described in Schedule A of this chapter, or for or in respect of the vellum,
parchment, or paper upon which such instruments, matters, or things, or
any of them, are written or printed, by any person who makes, signs,
issues, sells, removes, consigns, or ships the same, or for whose use or
benefit the same are made, signed, issued, sold, removed, consigned or
shipped, the several taxes specified in such schedule.' For state laws see
MASS. GEN. LAws (1921) c. 64, § 1; N. Y. TAX LAW (1909) § 270; PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 72, § 2041; S. C. Acts 1928, Act No. 574,
p. 1090. And see CHRISTY, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK (1929) §§ 300-303,
326-329.
For cases dealing with the problem of liability for stamp taxes see Mar-
coni Wireless Tel. Co. of America v. Duffy, 273 F. 197 (D. C. 1921); Pro-
vost; v. United States, 269 U. S. 443, 46 Sup. Ct. 152 (1925). These cases
do not, however, involve the problem suggested.
(2) Are defendants "agents" of F. J. Lisman & Co.? See infra note 145.
Neither of these issues is particularly relevant to the disposition of
the Kinney case. But they indicate the varied type of problem arising out
of the interpretation of the meanings of such words as "sell," "buy," "use,"
"benefit," and "own."
The Appellate Division found: "That defendants did not acquire title
to said stock at any time and did not resell the same to plaintiff." Record,
p. 208.
- 96 N. J. L. 555, 115 Atl. 79 (1921).
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where the transaction was upheld, the plaintiff purchased the
security from the originating house at the list price contemplated
by the defendant customer. In the Kinney case there was no im-
plication that the stock would be bought in other than the open
market. Defendants in the Kinney case had access to the dealers'
market in the stock and from previous transactions knew that a
dealer's concession was available to them there. In this connec-
tion. the case of Montgomery v. Hundley " is of interest. Defend-
ant had an option to buy shares from another stockholder for
$5,750. Defendant was not a broker but active in the manage-
ment of this small close corporation. He wrote plaintiff telling
him that one stockholder wanted to sell and that he could get the
stock for plaintiff for $7,000 and stating that the defendant had
no interest in it. Plaintiff thereupon purchased the stock and
received the shares directly from the selling stockholder. So far
as appears plaintiff did not pay defendant a commission. On
learning of defendant's profit on the deal, plaintiff tendered back
the shares and on refusal of defendant to accept brought an
action for rescission. In affirming judgment for plaintiff the court
said it was immaterial "that the sale was beneficial to the prin-
cipal (plaintiff) and worked no damage to him." The court rea-
soned that defendant was not the "owner" yet he had an option;
and when defendant consummated the sale to plaintiff it was
equivalent to exercising the option, taking the transfer and
making the transfer to plaintiff. The court reasoned that the
total effect was the same as if defendant had from the beginning
held the shares in his own name. In other words the vice of that
transaction was the presence of an adverse independent interest,
concealed from plaintiff, who was reposing confidence in the un-
biased judgment of defendant. It would seem that exactly the
same consequences should follow even though defendant had no
legal or equitable right to acquire the stock but nevertheless con-
summated the transaction in exactly the same way. The emphasis
seems properly placed on what he did rather than the method or
means he employed to do it. So in the Kinney case the presence
or absence of a commitment to take the shares or an option to
acquire them seems irrelevant. A broker's knowledge of the
amount of stock held by a dealer, its ready availability, and his
relationships with the dealer, might well make the certainty of
95 205 Mo. 138, 103 S. W. 527 (1907). Cf. Hindle v. Holcomb, 34 Wash.
336, 75 Pac. 873 (1904). And see Carpenter v. Fisher, 175 Dfass, 9, 65
N. E. 479 (1899), where, in an action by a real estate broker to recover
a commission from the buyer, the court said: "The option having been
given by word of mouth was not binding on Ross (the seller]; but had
the existence of the option been material this would have made no differ-
ence; the existence of such an arrangement, even if not binding, would
have incapacitated one from accepting duties inconsistent with his inter-
ests under the arrangement." Id. at 14, 55 N. E. at 480.
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his ability to acquire such stock as clear as if he had a legal
power over it through the exercise of an option.
Third, the Appellate Division failed to analyze sufficiently the
nature of the "secret profit" so as to distinguish a pure, dealer's
concession or re-allowance from compensation involving a sixty
day interest adverse to that of the customer. Defendants' adverse
interest in the transaction was as strong and their bias and self-
interest as patent, as if they were already committed to take the
stock 6 or had complete control and dominion over the certifi-
cates. In fact it seems that their adverse interest was even
stronger. If they were selling stock for which they had paid and
over which they had complete dominion and control, they would
be taking their profit at the consummation of the transaction and,
perhaps, tend to be unbiased in giving subsequent advice to plain-
tiff.9 But in the instant case their profit accrues only if plaintiff
retains the stock for sixty days. Any advice given by them during
that period, either at plaintiff's solicitation or otherwise, is going
to be self-serving and, conceivably, inconsistent with their better
judgment did they not have a profit at stake. In other words,
plaintiff acquires in addition to the vicissitudes of the market a
continuing sixty day adverse interest that well may influence the
exercise of his independent judgment 28 The stabilizing effect of
96 Even the Appellate Division doubted the "good faith" of defendants
in retaining the one point concession. Supra note 3, at 312, 247 N. Y.
Supp. at 120.
97 The type of adverse interest contemplated by the courts in the selling
of a broker's "own" stock is that the broker would then be interested in
getting a higher price. In the instant case the customer's limit order and
the quoted open market price would have deterred the defendants from
taking advantage in that way.
98 If, during the sixty days following the purchase of Camco stock, plain-
tiff had been advised by defendants not to sell, he might well have rea-
soned that such advice was being given contrary to defendants' profit
interest in securing commissions on brokerage transactions and so would
have considered it to be more impartial and disinterested than it obviously
would have been. He would not have known that because of the contingent
one point concession defendants had an interest in his retention of the
stock about seven times as strong as in his selling it.
Balkin for defendants on cross examination, Record pp. 147-149:
"Q. Were you trying to keep Kinney in his stock? A. No. Q. Did you
ever advise him that he should sell it? A. No. Q. He discussed with you
the propriety of selling it, did he not? A. No. Q. He discussed with you
the desirability of selling it, did he not? A. No. Q. He discussed with
you the question of whether he should keep it or sell it, did he not? A. Yes.
Q. When Kinney asked you whether or not he should keep his stock'
you did not disclose to him the fact that your firm was being paid to keep
people from selling their stock? A. He did not ask me. . . . Q. Didn't
you answer a question just a few minutes ago in which I asked you
whether or not he discussed with you the question of whether or not the
stock should be sold? Think about it. Didn't you say- A. We discussed
the prospects of the company and the progress of the company. Q. With
1932]
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immediate profit taking therefore is absent. Furthermore, de-
fendants' knowledge that such stock was generally available
through F. J. Lisman & Co. made likely that they would seek that
profitable source of income for their business as merchants. Now
what is likely to happen? Salesmen of the house will be apt tp
extol Cameo, point out its attractive features and by various
methods, direct and indirect, endeavor to interest customers.
Brokers do act as consultants and professional advisers as the
result of questions and queries propounded them by customers-
not as in an independent calling but as incidental to their own
business. Customers may or may not follow their advice. The
extent, if any, to which 'customers are influenced to make partic-
ular purchases as a result of such salesmanship obviously can-
not be determined. The factors in motivation are too subtle and
tenuous to result in anything but guesses. In the Kinney case it
appeared that over a period of months (probably dating back to
the time when defendants were members of the selling group and
a view of determining whether or not the stock should be sold? Isn't
that so? A. Yes. . . . Q. In any event you did not see fit to tell him all
you knew about the stock, did you? A. No. Q. Is it not a fact, MIr. Balkln,
that the subject of Cameo stock was a matter of concern and repeated
discussions in the office of Glenny, Monro & Moll? A. Yes. Q. The mar-
ket action of the stock became a subject of discussion, did it not? A. Yes.
* * * Q. And during the time that Kinney was asking about the desir-
ability of selling it or during the time he was talking about it, is that not
true? A. During the time he was talking about the stock."
The Appellate Division disapproved and reversed (Record, p. 204) find-
ings of the trial court respecting these subsequent conversations between
plaintiff and defendants. Among such findings were (Record, p. 131):
"18. That after February 13, 1929, the defendants continued to advise
plaintiff respecting the prospects of such corporation and its stock,
"19. That defendants were concerned about the stock of said corpo-
ration and secured information with respect thereto.
"20. That the defendants from time to time after February 13, 1929,
did not inform plaintiff in response to his inquiries of all they know or
had learned about such stock with reference to its prospects and the con-
dition of the corporation.
"23. That defendants gave advice to plaintiff regarding the desirability
of selling or retaining his stock during such period of sixty days and with-
held from him full information as possessed by them regarding the pros-
pects of the company and of its stock, and did not acquaint him with their
opportunity to avoid re-payment to Lisman & Co. of the sum of $500.00
in the event that plaintiff should not direct them to sell such stock."
No other findings relative to this matter were made by the Appellate
Division. The only evidence in refutation of the foregoing testimony was
given by Balkin on Redirect, Record, p. 158:
"Q. You did not tell him he would have to keep this for 60 days? A. No.
Q. Or induce him to keep it for 60 days? A. He was not bound to keep It
for 60 minutes."
And by Balkin on Direct, Record, p. 143:
"Q. After the purchase was made and the order was confirmed did
you ever ask him to keep the stock? A. No, sir."
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continuing after its termination) defendants' salesman had ex-
tolled the qualities of Camco to plaintiff and had furnished him
with literature5 It is impossible to escape the conclusion that
defendants' influence and persuasion played some part, perhaps
a dominant one. The unwholesomeness of the situation appears
when disclosure is not made. If the customer believes that the
advice and counsel being given is disinterested and bottomed on
an independent market judgment, he may weight it heavily. But
if he knows that such advice is colored by a selfish interest, he
will be likely to discount all that is recommended. Of course, he
may proceed to buy even though he knows that he is acting on
not disinterested advice. In the instant case the failure to dis-
close was clearly as detrimental to the plaintiff as it would have
been had defendants been carrying Cameo in their portfolio at
the time his order was placed. Accordingly, the same result
should be reached here as in the "ownership" cases discussed
above. There is no magic in "ownership." The adverse interest
necessarily incident to "ownership" inspires disloyalty. But other
forms of adverse interest likewise do, among them being the op-
portunity of waking an undisclosed profit i& any way. Transac-
tions like that consummated in the Kinney case represent one.
The fact that the body of legal precedent has grown out of rather
simple fact patterns should not crystallize the rule of law to
reach only those. The thrust of the legal rule should be deeper.
The accomplishment of an old result in a new way should not
99 Record, pp. 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 74, 75, 146, 147, 148, 157, 158.
The trial court found, Record, p. 90:
"14. That prior to the plaintiff's giving to defendants the order for
the purchase for him of the 500 shares of preferred stock defendants,
during the prior four months, lind uwukrtakc to interest plaintiff in the
purchase of stock of the Consolidated Automatic Merchandising Corpo-
ration.
"15. That as a result of such efforts of the defendants, plaintiff dfd
become interested and made two purclascs of such stock prior to giving
the order of February 13, 1929.
"16. That the defendants were within such period of four months
advising plaintiff to purchase more of the stock of such corporation.
"17. That the order for the purchase of the 500 shares of preferred
stock was given by plaintiff after receiving such advice from defendants."
The findings were disapproved and reversed by the Appellate Division
(Record p. 204) but no additional findings on those points were made. A
reading of the record clearly supports finding 14 of the trial court. De-
fendants clearly had been attempting "to interest" plaintiff in Cameo.
Perhaps the Appellate Division found fault with "advising" and "advice"
in 16 and 17, and with "as a result" in 15. Yet from the record it would
be exceedingly difficult to attempt a differentiation between "interest" and
"advice." The same may be said for "as a result." Absolute cause and
effect would be impossible to determine. The record does show, however,
an intimate relationship between plaintiff's decision to buy and defendants'
salesmanship, in spite of testimony for defendants (Record, p. 143) that
Balkin did not solicit the order for 500 shares.
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blind chancery to the end reached. The intricacies of modern
finance with new techniques and specialized procedure call as
much for wholesome doctrines of equity and morality as the de-
vices of a simpler and less complex order.
The reasoning of the Appellate Division therefore is only dia-
lectically responsive to plaintiff's argument. It fails to show dis-
cernment in either the substance or the form of the transaction.
Perhaps the reason for this disagreement with the reasoning will
appear more clearly if further aspects of security distribution
are explored.
Broker-Dealer
It is apparent that the problem presented in the Kinney case
would be likely to arise if a security house performed the func-
tions both of brokerage and retail security distribution and failed
to distinguish carefully for its customers those transactions in
which it acted as "agent" for the customer from those in which
it acted as a "principal" or as the "agent" of a third party. In
the Kinney case, however, plaintiff understood that defendants
were to have acted in the usual way as his broker or "agent" and
defendants claim that they did act in that capacity.100
If a brokerage house acted solely as "agent" for its customers,
executing orders on exchanges, over-the-counter, or in such man-
ner as directed or contemplated by the customers, with the object
of obtaining the best bargain for the customers under the restric-
tions imposed on the transactions, disclosing all details of the
transactions known to it, and charging a regular fee for services
rendered, the problem would not occur. Nor would it in the case
of a house acting solely as a merchant in securities, buying them
from issuing companies, other houses, or syndicates of which it
was a member, and endeavoring to sell them to customers at an
advance in price sufficient to cover expenses and yield a net profit.
Now if the merchant acquired his inventory from the same
sources normally employed by brokers in buying securities for
their customers (i. e., on exchanges and over-the-counter), but
with the object of selling them as before, it seems that he would
still remain a merchant. Nor does there appear to be any re-
quirement that the security merchant, any more than other mer-
chants, should have on hand at the time contracts of sale are
made the securities contracted for. His salesmen may sell stocks
A, B, and C, of which he has an ample supply of A to meet his
orders, insufficient B, and no C. When he buys enough more B
and sufficient C to fill his orders, he does not thereby act as the
100 This is admitted (p. 67 of respondents' brief) before the Court of
Appeals and is assumed throughout all of respondents' argument, The




"agent" for his customers, even though his salesmen make the
sales subject to confirmation and even though his gross profit
amounts to no more than the brokers' fee. He might, of course,
inform his customers (and they agree) that on a specific trans-
action he would act as an "agent." But in the absence of express
stipulation it would not appear that he had changed his character
from that of a merchant.
It appears, then, that the security merchant may acquire his
security inventory through any source and buy the securities in
any manner and yet remain a merchant, being the actual vendor
or the "agent" of the vendor. In the absence of express restric-
tions by the customer, however, may a broker acquire securities
for his customer in any manner and yet be held to have acted
within the scope of his "agency"? Assume that the broker, with-
out special notice to the customer, obtained securities for his
customer through channels normally open only to the security
merchant and retained undisclosed the profit allowed to the mer-
chant. Would this distinguishing characteristic mark him as a
merchant or the "agent" of a third-party merchant, placing him
in an adverse position which the rules of fiduciary duty con-
demn?
The sources normally open only to the security merchant are
syndicates, selling groups, and what, for lack of a better term,
we may call "wholesalers." If a broker obtained securities for his
customer from a syndicate of which he was a member, there
would seemingly be little question but that he was acting as a
"principal," or as an "agent" of the syndicate in which he was a
joint adventurer and in which his adverse interest was paramount
and certain, as in the cases discussed above where the "agent"
sells his "own" property to his employer. The one borderline
case might be that of a broker who was a member of a limited-
liability syndicate in which there was no trading account, no obli-
gation of members to take back securities repurchased in the
open market by the syndicate managers during the life of the
syndicate, and no extra over-sales commissions, and in which the
broker, prior to the transaction for his customer, had taken down
from the syndicate and sold an amount of securities at least equal
to his participation. In that case, his purchase from the syndi-
cate would resemble a selling group transaction, but such a set
of circumstances would be of unique occurrence. His interest in
the average selling group would be more extensive, because of
the usual repurchase penalties.
In buying securities through a selling group, the merchant may
follow either of two courses. Upon being invited to join the
group and subscribe, he may subscribe immediately for the full
amount he wishes to sell. He would be likely to do this if he
thought the securities. would be in great demand and the sub-
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scription books quickly closed, or if he thought he would incur
the ill-will of a prominent originating house by failing to sub-
scribe promptly for his quota. He would then be committed for
a definite amount of the securities as definitely as in a limited-
liability selling syndicate, except that he would have no trading
account liability. He would very probably be subject, however,
to a repurchase penalty of redelivery or commission cancellation.
The other course would be to subscribe for securities in the sell-
ing group only as he secured orders from his customers. He
would thus eliminate one element of risk, though he would nor-
mally still be subject to the risk of the repurchase penalty. The
merchant would always prefer this course, and would follow it
in every instance were it not for one or both of the factors men-
tioned above which sometimes determines the other course. The
differentiation between the courses, then, is not one of "agent"
and "principal" but of mercantile expediency.
If our hypothetical broker followed the former course, he
would unquestionably not be acting as the disinterested, unbiased
"agent" of his customers, but as a vendor or "principal" with a
decidedly adverse interest. If conditions were expedient to the
latter course, and he was compensated as a merchant for dis-
tributing the securities and keeping them off the open market for
a specified period, it does not appear that the essential nature of
the transaction is changed though he might in some instances be-
come the "agent" of the vendor rather than the "principal" or
vendor. Because he buys them against a specific order and not
on an exchange does not imply that he is buying them "over the
counter." He is buying them on selling group terms-as a mer-
chant. The over-the-counter market is as well recognized as the
exchanges as a market for many securities. As a true market,
distributing commissions are no more allowed on the over-the-
counter market than they are on the exchanges. Such commis-
sions are indices of wholesale distribution or of the "investment
guaranteed" market, not the open market.
Now in the absence of syndicate or selling group membership
by the small merchant, he may buy securities on wholesale or
investment guaranteed terms from other dealers, the originating
house, or the issuing company, and in so doing he may follow
either of the courses open to him in the selling group. He is,
however, more likely to buy against orders than to acquire inven-
tory in advance, for at least one of the factors motivating him
to assume the greater risk (that of retaining the good-will of the
originating house by accepting a specific offer) would probably
be absent. The very fact that securities were available at such
sources would indicate that those securities were not highly at-
tractive as inventory. Investment guaranteed terms could prob-
ably be had from other dealers only during the life of a syndi-
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cate or group, when they would be willing to allow concessions
to avoid repurchase penalties. The originating house, however,
would usually be willing to allow a dealer's concession, subject
to guaranteed investment placement, after the close of a dis-
tributing syndicate or group if it had on its hands unsold or
repurchased securities. Such a concession would be allowed to
dealers as an incentive to distribute the securities and to place
them with buyers who would hold them rather than let them
come back on to the open market.
What if our broker utilizes such sources without disclosure to
his customers? Can he be differentiated from the dealer, the
merchant? Has he bought on the open market? To answer the
last question, he obviously has not. He has bought on the dealers'
or investment guaranteed market. He has not bought the secur-
ities over-the-counter, in the accepted sense; "I, he certainly has
not bought them on an "exchange." The broker, in this instance,
would have acquired the securities at the source, in the manner,
and at the price of a merchant-not on the open market. No one
of those conditions would have been contemplated by a brokerage
customer. They would have been contemplated only by the cus-
tomer of a merchant.
In the Kinny case, the defendants acquired the stock from the
investment house sponsoring the issue after the close of the sell-
ing group; bought it in a way and at a concession the partner of
the investment house testified was open only to recognized dis-
tributors.10 2 The terms were similar to those of a typical selling
group. Instead of the list price of the selling group, the last sale
price was substituted as the base price, as is customary in sec-
ondary distribution. If the preceding analysis is sound, then the
defendants here, whether "principals," or "agents" of the origi-
nating house, were not representing solely the interests of the
plaintiff in the disputed transaction but had clearly assumed a
biased and antagonistic position.
To summarize this analysis, there are roughly two sources of
securities open to the dealer, the open market and the dealers'
market. The open market includes exchanges and the over-the-
counter market. The market peculiar to the dealer is not on an
exchange, but it is not, therefore, an over-the-counter market.
Its distinguishing characteristic is a concession impliedly to be
101 This distinction between the open over-the-counter market and the
dealers' market or investment guaranteed market is not made in the
Kinney case. There the only definition is given by Balkin, for defendants,
on direct examination: "Q. What does 'over-the-counter' mean? A. It
means anywhere excepting the Exchange. It means between two brokers
or between two individuals." Record, p. 140.
102 Record, pp. 108, 120, 128, 132, 133, 134.
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retained by the dealer for services rendered, either in distribu-
tion or underwriting, or both.
Because a dealer receives the concession as an incident to an
order already received does not alter the case by extinguishing
the incentive to secure orders--to distribute. But if, for the sake
of argument, it be temporarily conceded that a dealer purchases
securities for a customer from such a source and the concession
is in no way considered compensation for distribution, but only
for underwriting (i.e., for guaranteeing investment placement
for a specified period), this hypothetical distinction would not
appear to have changed the nature of the transaction, for the
dealer would be delivering to his customer securities in which he
had an interest. In many instances the dealer would have to
accept the repurchased securities or stand cancellation of his
commission, at the option of the one from whom he acquired the
securities, should he be required to make good his underwriting.
But even if only the lesser penalty were exacted, that of cancella-
tion of commission, it is readily apparent that the contingent
concession would still act as an incentive to the dealer to keep
the securities in the hands of his customer-to maintain the dis-
tribution accomplished. So the distinction in terms of incentive
between the distribution and underwriting components of the
concession to the retail dealer would in reality be one between
incentive for initial distribution and incentive for continued dis-
tribution.
There seems no escape from the conclusion that a broker, in
buying in the manner peculiar to a dealer, is exceeding his au-
thority as to place and manner of purchase, and that the undis-
closed concession for either distribution or underwriting unques-
tionably marks him as a dealer and not a broker in such a trans-
action. In the opinions defendants were described as "stock-
brokers." From the testimony and from their listing with the
trade, they were also "participating distributors," i.e., dealers-
merchants. Since their firm was not represented by membership
in the New York Stock Exchange, and it was obliged to split
commissions with a correspondent on trades executed on the New
York Curb Market, 0 3 it may well be inferred that their chief
business, over d period of years, was as merchant rather than
broker. As one defendant testified, concessions rather than cx-
change commissions constituted the "life blood" of their busi-
.ness.10 4
We find, then, that defendants were responsible for this diffi-
culty in failing to distinguish carefully their two types of busi-
ness. At one time, they apparently attempted some such distinc-
tion, by having three types of confirmations: one for exchange
103 Record, pp. 154, 155.
104 Record, pp. 183, 184.
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transactions, another for those executed over-the-counter, and a
third for those in which they acted as dealers rather than brokers.
They later failed to distinguish between the last two types of
transactions, at least on the confirmations. °
The practice of confusing the two lines of business apparently
is not of recent origin. As long ago as 1831 the House of Lords
condemned it in no uncertain language. The case Wr, involved an
action in equity for a rescission by customer against broker.
There were many transactions involved. But one in particular
is of interest here. The broker Rothschild was the "contractor"
for certain Prussian bonds. In advising plaintiff to buy he did not
disclose the fact that he intended supplying the bonds from his
"own" holdings, as in fact he did. After concluding that plaintiff
was entitled to relief, Lord Wynford speaking for the court said:
"I repeat that Air. Rothschild has only on this occasion followed
a practice which I believe has been acted upon in London. It is
fit your Lordships should say, in language that cannot be misun-
derstood, that these practices must not continue to prevail ...
If one of the parties is in a situation which is not fairly disclosed
to the other, which if the other had known he would not have
relied on his judgment and advice, nor have acted upon or
adopted any act of his, such a transaction ought not to be al-
lowed." -7
Human nature seems hardly to have changed so much in the lasi
hundred years as to call for a different rule for the market place
today.
It could hardly be maintained that customers should be forced
to differentiate between functions of security houses. It is diffi-
cult to believe that they are sufficiently aware of those differences
to make distinctions. At least, when they deal with one who pur-
ports to be a broker (as was admittedly the situation in the Kin-
ney case) it is impossible to justify a presumption that they
should know he may also be a dealer and trade with them as
such. Accordingly if a security house, doing business both as
brokers and as merchants, fails in its dealings with customers
to distinguish clearly between its two lines, the courts should not
attempt to make the distinction for them.
Disclosure anzd the Confirnuation
The question of what constitutes disclosure remains. There are
not many decided cases ruling on the point. But those that are
207 Record, pp. 190, 191, 192. The Appellate Division found: "That said
notice of confirmation was in the ordinary form used by the defendants
for confirming purchases of stock over the counter and not on the ex-
change." Record, p. 208.
3o6 Rothschild v. Brookman, supra. note 79.
107 Id. at 202.
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available are of interest. In some cases the facts producing
knowledge on the part of the customer are not completely shown
but have been passed on by trial court or jury and bare con-
clusions stated. Thus in Schofield v. Jackson 108 it appeared that
defendant was an underwriter of shares of a new issue. Plain-
tiff knew the stock was not listed but "was an original issue the
sale of which the defendant was promoting." The court con-
cludes on all the evidence that plaintiff must have known he was
buying defendant's stock. Similar findings were made in Trow-
bridge v. O'Neill 109 and In re B. Solomon & Co.110
Of more general interest are the cases which involve various
types of confirmation, where the broker contends that the content
of the confirmation is notice and full disclosure of his adverse
interest. Confirmations used by brokers and dealers were des-
cribed in the early part of this article."' Assume that the only
evidence of disclosure is the "sold to you" confirmation. Is that
sufficient? It would seem that it is not, and for the following
reasons. It is doubtful if a customer would be conscious of the
distinction being drawn between his particular transaction and
other -transactions. His attention would be drawn primarily to
the fact that the purchase had been consummated and to the
debit item appearing. Furthermore it is unlikely he would be
thinking in terms of the form of contract he had made. His con-
tract had been effected earlier when he gave the order. He would
accordingly tend to treat the confirmation as a formal memoran-
dum of the deal rather than as an explanation and description
of the kind of contract he had made.112 He need have the dis-
cernment of a merchant or a broker to realize the import of the
news being transmitted to him. Further, if such dual positions
of brokers are to be sanctioned and approved it seems that the
disclosure should be obvious and unambiguous. As recently
stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo: "If dual interests are to be served,
the disclosure to be effective must lay bare the truth, without
ambiguity or reservation, in all its stark significance." 1
108 99 Conn. 515, 122 Atl. 98 (1923).
10 243 Mich. 84, 219 N. W. 681 (1928). Defendants were members of
a selling group in the original distribution of stock of the Dort Motor
Co., and had subscribed for a quota of the stock. The trial court found
that plaintiff "knew that this was a syndicated stock" and that he "know
just as much as the broker knew himself, of the relationship between the
broker and the stock." The relation between plaintiff and defendant ac-
cordingly was held to be vendee-vendor and the remedy of rescission not
available.
11y 268 Fed. 108 (C. C: A. 2d, 1920). On all the facts the court con-
cluded that plaintiff must have bought the stock with knowledge that the
market was being "rigged" and artificial prices created.
1- See the discussion supra, pp. 953, 984 et seq.
112 On the effect of the confirmation see discussion infra note 153.
113 Wendt v. Fischer, supra note 73. That case did not involve a -stdck
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The cases, though extremely few in number, are in accord. The
leading one is McNidty v. Whitney'14 recently decided by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. That was an action
by a customer, inter alia, for rescission, in a case in which the
broker elected, on an over-the-counter transaction, to act as a
dealer (as described above 113) and in which there was a ques-
tion whether the plaintiff had notice of defendant's position in
the transaction. From a judgment for plaintiff on a jury trial the
case was brought up on defendant's exceptions. Though a hum-
brokerage transaction but a sale of realty by plaintiff through defendant
brokers. The list price was $75,000 and $10,000 cash. Defendants offered
from a client $80,000 and $7,500 cash which plaintiff accepted. The con-
tract of sale was executed by plaintiff and a third party dummy, the real
purchaser being defendant corporation the sole stockholder of which was
one partner in the brokerage house. Plaintiff was allowed to recover from
the brokers the commission and from the corporation the secret profits.
Defendants tried to prove disclosure by the statement to plaintiff that the
sale was to a client in their office.
An analogy from another field was recently presented in Smokeless Fuel
Co. -. Western United Corp., 19 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927) involv-
ing an action for an accounting by the seller of coal against its "agent"
for secret profits. There was a contract at will between the parties con-
stituting defendants as "commission agents" to sell the coal of plaintiff
for a 7% commission. Defendant claimhed that subsequently it terminated
the contract and ceased to be an "agent" and became a buyer from plain-
tiff. Though there was some evidence that defendant regarded these trans-
actions as sales to it the court affirmed judgment for plaintiff and said
(p. 836) :
"Parties seeking to set up a new contract or change an existing one
must carry the burden of proof, and an agent, once having accepted that
role with his principal, with all the obligations such a relationship car-
ries with it, owes to his principal the duty of full and complete disclosure
concerning all details of the transaction. It is the duty of an agent, seek-
ing to change an admitted contract of sale on a commission to one of sale
outright to the agent at a fixed price, to bring such change to the atten-
tion of his principal in such a manner as to avoid all chance of mis-
understanding."
It would seem that, even though it was customary for brokers and dealers
to follow the precise procedures as in either the Kinncy or M Nulty cases
in filling orders for their customers, such usage or custom would not be
a valid defense to the actions of the customers where it was not shown
that the customers were familiar with the usage. It has been so held in
analogous situations where such custom, if incorporated into the contract,
would have transformed the broker from an "agent" to a "principal," i. c.,
vendor. Robinson v. Mollett, L. R. 7 H. L. 802 (1875); Day v. Holmes,
103 Mass. 306 (1869); Hall v. Paine, supra note 70; Bostock v. Jardine,
3 H. & C. 700 (1865). And see Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499, 4 Sup.
Ct. 160 (1884); Harris v. Tumbridge, 83 N. Y. 92 (1880); Tetley v.
Shand, supra note 81. Cf. Farnsworth v. Hemmer, 83 Mass. 494 (1861);
Cook v. Flagg, supra note 78;, Baker v. Drake, 66 N. Y. 518 (1876);
Horton v. Morgan, supra note 64; Robbins v. Maher, 14 N. D. 228, 103
N. W. 755 (1905). The opposite result has been reached where the broker
sells to himself as broker for another customer pursuant to the rules of
the exchange. See supra note 78.
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ber of points were involved there is but one of interest here. The
Supreme Court ruled that the jury could have found that plain-
tiff was not told and did not know that "unlisted securities" were
sold directly by defendants to their customers. The shares in
question were unlisted. The confirmation slips used by defend-
ants for listed securities said "bought for your account and risk";
for unlisted securities "sold to you." Plaintiff received the latter
type of confirmation and noted that there was no commission
charged. He inquired of defendants why there was no commis-
sion and wondered if there had not been some mistake. The evi-
dence as to whether plaintiff was informed that defendants were
acting as dealers was in dispute but plaintiff testified that the
answer to his inquiry was: "That is all right. Never mind. That
is all right now. We didn't charge any commission." "I Defend-
ants contended that plaintiff, as a matter of law, had notice they
were selling him their own shares, and, therefore, he could not
rescind on that ground. This court, however, held that the trial
judge was justified in not ruling that the confirmation slips were
notice to him that the defendants were selling their own stock.
The court went on to say of these slips:
"They were not part of the original contract. Leviten v. Bickley,
Mandeville & Wimple, Inc., 35 Fed. Rep. (2d) 825, 826. To main-
tain the contention that they bound the plaintiff with knowledge
that he was buying the defendants' property, it must appear not
only that he read or should have read them but also that if read
they would give him notice of a direct sale. The absence from the
slips of a charge for commission could not be ruled to be notice
of a direct sale, especially in view of the answer received by the
plaintiff when he directed the attention of the defendants' agent
to this omission. It cannot be said as matter of law that the words
"Sold to" on the slips concerning the stock in question, either
when the slips are considered by themselves or in connection with
other slips representing purchases by the defendants as brokers,
bound the plaintiff with notice that the defendants were selling
him their own stock. See Metcalf v. Williams, 144 Mass. 452,
454; Greenburg v. Whitney, 245 Mass. 303, 306. The words are
not necessarily inconsistent with the interpretation that the
114 Supra note 80.
115 See discussion supra, pp. 952, 980 et seq.
216 An examination of the testimony at the trial shows that this was a
highly controverted question of fact and that there was much evidence
that plaintiff was informed. The case was remanded for a new trial and
a hearing before an auditor has since been had. The auditor's report on that
second hearing states (p. 6) : "Upon all the evidence I am convinced that by
September 11, 1926, when the first transaction in Nonquitt Spinning Com-
pany stock occurred, the plaintiff had notice of the fact that when he pur-
chased or sold unlisted stock he was dealing directly with the defendants is
principals rather than as brokers acting for him on a commission basis."
At the time of this writing the new trial has not been had,
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brokers were selling propelt of another customer as in Hall Va.
Paine, 224 Mass. 62, 74, 76. It was for the jury to say under all
the circumstances whether the confirmation slips were notice to
the plaintiff that he was buying directly from the defendants,
or should have put him upon inquiry to ascertain if that was so.
Picard v. Beers, 195 Mass. 419, 428." 117
The same result was reached in Williams v. Boling 123 where
rescission was allowed by the customer eight years after the
transaction. In contrast to the McNulty case this involved a
problem arising out of an original distribution of securities.
Plaintiff, a customer, sued defendants, brokers, for rescission of
sales and purchases of certain stocks and bonds by plaintiff.
Plaintiff resided in another city and corresponded with defend-
ants over a long period of time seeking their advice on invest-
ments. The letter from defendants preceding the transactions
recommended sale of certain stock at the market and purchase,
with the proceeds, of bonds and other stock at a stated price "in
the banker's syndicate." It may be inferred that defendants
"owned" or were committed for the bonds and stock they were
selling. Upon order to consummate the transactions as recom-
mended, defendants wrote plaintiff confirming the sales and pur-
chases.
There was nothing to indicate that the sale of stock had been
other than a brokerage transaction, but in fact they purchased
for their "own" account. The price allowed for this stock was
shown to have been above the current market price. In the sale
of bonds and other stock, however, no commission was charged.
The price was the list price of the securities "in the bankers'
syndicate." The confirmation read "we have today sold you."
Accompanying the confirmation was a letter saying "we have
sold for you" the stock and "charge you by the cost of" the bonds
and other stock. The letter also said: "We have given you this
participation in the Bankers' Syndicate.... ." Judgment for plain-
tiff was affirmed. The court made the following points: (1) In
order to rescind plaintiff need not show any damage suffered; the
breach of fiduciary duty is sufficient." ' (2) Plaintiff had no
knowledge that defendants were purchasing the stock for them-
M" 273 Mass. at 501-502, 174 N. E. at 124.
11M 138 Va. 244, 121 S. E. 270 (1924).
119 The court emphasized that there were no allegations or evidence what-
ever that defendants acted other than "in the most scrupulously honest
and upright manner, insofar as their intention was concerned;" that
"in good faith" they thought that they had made it plain to plaintiff they
were selling him their "own" securities. The court, however, stated that
for reasons of "public policy" the rules enunciated transcended "all con-
sideration of any individual interests involved in any particular case in
which it does not affirmatively appear that the agent has in fact made
the disclosure.' Id. at 271, 121 S. E. at 277.
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selves or "owned" any of the bonds and other stock plaintiff ac-
quired. (3) The reference in the letter of the bonds being "in the
banker's syndicate" did not apprise plaintiff that he was buying
defendants' bonds. (4) The confirmation stating "Sold you" was
not sufficient notice10 On this point the court remarked that
plaintiff did not notice the language of the confirmation until the
case was being prepared for trial. The court also said:
"In view of the fact that the letters were the source to which the
appellee would naturally look for information which the appel-
lants might have sought to convey to him on the subject of the
transaction, rather than the memorandum, which he would nat-
urally infer had reference to the same and not to a different
transaction from that which was the subject of the mutual cor-
respondence, we do not think that the contents of the memoran-
dum, when reasonably construed along with the letters...
and in the light of the other evidence disclosing the mental atti-
tude of the appellee, can be said to have been such that it ought
to have attracted the attention of the appellee at the time it was
received ... or it should have conveyed to him the aforesaid
meaning which appellants claim it should have conveyed, and
which they thought that it and their letters did convey." 1 1 The
court went on to say that for the communication to be held to
convey by inference the information "the inference must be so
obvious that it is apparent" that the other party "willfully shut
his eyes to what he might readily and ought to have known."
(5) The absence of a commission on the memorandum was not
notice to plaintiff, the court concluding that plaintiff would nat-
urally.expect such information to appear not there but in "an
account rendered." 122 It is apparent that the peculiar facts of
the case make it somewhat ,pathological. The purchase of the
stock by defendants was clearly voidable. That was so intimately
connected with the sale of the bonds and other stock to plaintiff
that perhaps it colored the whole transaction in the eyes of the
court. That factor, however, was not emphasized by the court.
Nevertheless, the case is not such persuasive authority as it
would be were the sale to plaintiff of the bonds and other stock
divorced from the purchase by defendants of the stock.12
120 Cf. Pence v. Langdon, 99 U. S. 578 (1878).
121 Supra note 118, at 268, 269, 121 S. E. at 276.
12 One judge dissented not on the general rules enunciated but on their
application to the particular facts at hand.
13 Rothschild v. Brookman, supra note 79, is closely parallel both on
its facts and holdings. That was an action of rescission by customer
against broker for the sale and purchase on several occasions of various
securities. The action was brought some six years after transactions had
been consummated. Here also plaintiff was reposing confidence in the
judgment of defendant; and on his advice ordered sold French rconlo and
Prussian bonds purchased. Defendant purchased the rcntes for his firm
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and supplied the bonds "out of his own stock." The confirmation of the
sale of rentes stated that defendant had had the "opportunity to dispose
of" them. As to the purchase of bonds it stated "I have invested the
proceeds of the Sale in Prussian Bonds." Subsequently plaintiff ordered
through his brokers (not defendant) additional Prussian bonds, the con-
firmations stating "We have bought on your account, of N. M. Rothschild2
On all the purchases Rothschild made advances taking plaintiff's note and
holding the bonds as security. No bonds were specifically earmarked and
set aside by defendant for plaintiff.
There was no disclosure to plaintiff that defendant had purchased the
ventes for his firm. Shortly afterwards the rentes rose in price and the
bonds fell. There was no evidence that plaintiff received less than the
fair market price of the day for the rentes. In all of the purchases and
sales defendant charged commissions. It appeared that plaintiff knew
that defendant was "contractor" for the Prussian bonds. In fact plaintiff
had become a "Subscriber to the Loan" through defendant previous to the
transactions in question. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. The House
of Lords emphasized the voidability of the sale of the rentes, saying p.
191: "If the broker ... instead of going to the stock market, or instead
of exercising a discretion as to the period when he should sell any stock,
is to take that stock to himself, he deprives me of the security I have, and
the confidence I repose in his skill and intelligence. .. ." As to the bonds
purchased the same court said, p. 192: "It does not follow that this gen-
tleman, because he knew that Mr. Rothschild was the contractor with the
King of Prussia for this loan, knew that he had not parted with a very
considerable proportion of the bonds he so contracted for, if not the whole.
The principal had a right to suppose, when his agent advised him to buy
Prussian bonds, that they were to be bought of other persons; he had a
right to suppose he was not transferring his own bonds to him, but that
he -was making a purchase of other bonds in the market. . . ."
Thus there is present in this case, as well as in Williams v. Boling,
supra note 118, the factor of a voidable purchase by a broker of his cus-
tomer's security followed by an investment of the proceeds in other
securities. The two transactions were so connected that that relationship
may have had some influence on the court. But here the case was even
stronger for plaintiff than in Williams v. Bolling, for the broker charged
commissions on all the transactions and the confirmations would not put
plaintiff on notice of any departure from a normal brokerage transaction.
There was moreover another factor in the case that distinguishes it
and that the court stresses. None of these bonds in Rothschild's posses-
sion was specifically earmarked as plaintiff's. As to that the court said
(pp. 195-196): "If Mr. Rothschild had bought these bonds, as it is pre-
tended by the papers he did, these bonds could never have been liable to
any of the debts which Mr. Rothschild had contracted: but as it is, Mr.
Rothschild not having bought these bonds, they being his from the begin-
ning, they remaining so till they were set apart and appropriated to
Mr. Brookman; if the bonds had risen in price, and if Mr. Rothschild had
failed, Mr. Brookman must have lost the security of these bonds at that
increased price.
"It may be as likely that the bank of England should fail, as that Mr.
Rothschild should fail. It may be, that nothing would be likely to diminish
his ability to answer all demands upon him. But it is enough to decide
that the Respondent had a right to say, I will not trust to the security
of Mr. Rothschild or anybody else; I will have these bonds, so that the
King of Prussia may be security for my debt, and not Mr. Rothschild or
any other proprietors of bonds."
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Another case of interest is Sutro v. Jacobson,12 4 where plain-
tiff acquired for the defendant securities which were in process
of original distribution. Plaintiff obtained these securities from
the syndicate at the list price, below which neither he nor the
defendant could at the timelhave obtained them from the syndi-
cate or in the open market. Plaintiff was allowed by the syndi-
cate a concession which was not reallowed to customers. It was
held 125 that this "was not a secret profit to the injury of the
The case is thus much stronger for the customer than either Williams
v. Bolling or McNulty v. Whitney, supra note 80. It is interesting to note
that this court (as did the court in Williams v. Bolling) went to consider-
able length to point out that the broker did not give "advice with any
dishonest view whatever"; that he acted "fairly and properly"; but that
the rule imposed "goes wide of that" and is a "law of jealousy." These
rules then are not being designed solely for crooks and those engaged in
glaringly fraudulent transactions.
[Note: A much more complete statement of facts is to be found In the
case before Vice-Chancellor Shadwell reported in 3 Sim. 153 (1829).]
124 Supra note 94.
125 In this case plaintiffs "were stockbrokers and members of the Now
York Stock Exchange." By request of defendant (as the jury found) "they
subscribed for $25,000 worth of the bonds of Great Britain at 101 and
interest." This subscription, dependent on the approval of J. P. Morgan
-& Co., was approved and plaintiffs paid the money and took up the sub-
scription for defendant. The price of the bonds depreciated and defendant,
being called upon for margin, ordered the bonds sold, which plaintiffs did
at a loss of $620, for which suit was brought. Defendant appealed from a
judgment for plaintiff. Defendant contended he was entitled to a non-
suit because the value of the bonds was over $500 and the provisions of
the Sales Act (N. J. Comir. STAT. (1910) p. 4648) applied. That act pro-
vided that a contract to sell, or a sale of goods or choses in action of the
value of $500 or more should not be enforceable unless the buyer accepts
part of the goods or choses in action and actually received the same, or
gave something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or
unless some note or memorandum in writing was signed "by the party
to be charged or his agent in his behalf." The trial court charged the
jury to determine "(1) were the bonds ordered by defendant; (2) if
ordered, were plaintiffs selling their own bonds, or were they acting as
brokers for the defendant; (3) if they found that plaintiffs were not acting
as brokers, but were selling their own bonds, whether the defendant . . .
had accepted the bonds or exercised any dominion over them, and that
if he did, then the plaintiffs were not prevented from recovery." Supra
note 94, at 556, 115 At. at 80. It appeared, as noted above, that the jury
found defendant ordered the bonds. It does not appear whether the jury
found that plaintiffs were acting as "brokers" for defendant or wore
selling their "own" bonds. If the former, then apparently the Sales Act
would be satisfied. If the latter, and the jury also found defendant accepted
the bonds, then the Sales Act also would be satisfied. Judgment for plain-
tiffs was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The objections raised by defend-
ant on appeal were not to the above charges. One was that the court
omitted to submit to the jury the question whether plaintiffs were acting
as "brokers for the syndicate"; but that request was held not to have
been made. The court refused to charge, as requested, that if plaintiffs
were entitled to recover, defendant was entitled to a credit, representing
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defendant." The nature and conditions of this "secret profit" do
not appear from the brief report of the case. It might be assumed
that it was merely a1 dealer's reallowance (mentioned above).'--
If it involved market protection or syndicate membership, how-
ever, the adverse interest of the plaintiff might be involved. The
court states further, however, that .defendant "also knew that
the plaintiffs were obtaining these subscriptions for the syndi-
cate." With disclosure indicated, the circumstances of the case
are far removed from th6se in the Kinney case.
What bearing do these cases have on the Kinaey case? The
confirmation there read:
We take pleasure in confirming sale to you today of 500 shares
Consolidated Automatic Merchandising Corporation
Pfd. @ 35 ............................... $17,750.00
Plus Commission .............................. 75.00
$17,825.00
Not only was there no evidence that the words "sale to you"
conveyed any special significance to plaintiff, but there was every
indication that they meant something different to defendants
than their recognized import in the investment and brokerage
business, judged either by the evidence in such cases as Williams
v. Boling or McNulty v. Whitney or by an independent survey
of customary usages. Further the case is weaker for defendants
than the MeNulty case. The presence on the confirmation slip of
a $75 commission charge certainly would not raise the doubts
which might well be raised if no commission were charged. By
being greedier than defendants in the other cases can the de-
fendants acquire more effective insulation from liability? Is it
possible that the degree of fiduciary duty decreases as the undis-
closed avails are increased by a disclosed commission? Of course
the presence of commission charges is an earmark of the
the per centun allowed by the syndicate to plaintiffs for securing sub-
scriptions, defendant's theory being that as plaintiffs were acting as broker-3
for defendant they were not entitled to make a secret profit. It was said:
"The evidence shows that these bonds could not be subscribed for for less
than 101, that being the required cost to the subscriber, and this the
defendant knew, or a jury might so infer from the evidence, and he also
knew that the plaintiffs were obtaining these subscriptions for the syndi-
cate, and that he himself could not have obtained any subscription at less
than 101. The percentage paid by the syndicate to the plaintiffs was not
a secret profit to the injury of the defendant.' Id at 557, 115 Atl. at 80.
This judgment of the Supreme Court was affirmed by the Court of Errors
and Appeals for the reasons expressed in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
':GSupra, pp. 980, et seq.
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"agency" relation.127 It would appear as a part of the normal
bilateral contract between customer and broker. Accordingly its
presence would tend to confirm that the parties (so far as they
could be said to advert to such distinctions) were thinking in
terms of a normal brokerage transaction. In that event the case
for plaintiff would be even stronger. It could not be argued (in
terms of the confirmation above) as it was in the MeNulty case
that the parties were dealing as customer and merchant or ven-
dee and vendor. As they purport to act as customer and broker
or as "principal" and "agent" (as admitted by defendants) they
have by their own admissions classified themselves in a legal cate-
gory where the strictest rules of fiduciary duty come into play.
There is no clearer case of "blowing hot and cold" at the same
time than defendants' assertion that they were "agents" of plain-
tiff-ergo they might obtain a commission from him in addition
to a secret profit in the formof a dealer's concession. It is not so
strange that counsel for defendants took that line of attack. Per-
force, it was about the only one left open for them.. It would
have been difficult to sustain the proposition that defendants
were "principals" acting at arm's length in face of the commis-
sion, strong evidence of the assumption of a brokers "agency"
activities. But the surprising thing is to find a distinguished
court allowing them to be extricated from the difficulties en-
gendered by their greed by such specious reasoning.",,
Remedies
One might well agree that defendants had not acted in good
faith and had breached the confidence and trust of plaintiff and
be reluctant to go so far as to invoke the remedy of rescission
sought by plaintiff. On this point the Appellate Division said:
"The taking of a secret profit by. a broker does not make him in
law the purchaser of the stock or committed therefor, at least so
far as his customer is concerned. In such case the customer is
injured in the amount of the undisclosed vails acquired by the
agent, and in a proper action he may recover them. (McMillan v,.
Arthur, 98 N. Y. 167; 3 Suth. Dam. [4th ed.] 2927; 1 Clark N.
Y. Law of Damages 530.)....
"It scarcely need be said that the action is not based upon a
claim that defendants were employed by the sellers of the stock
127 The cases emphasize, as an earmark of the "agency" relation, the
presence of a commission or brokerage fee. See, e. V., Tetley v. Shand,
supra note 81, at 660.
227a It is interesting to note, also, that defendants' profit was greater by
more than the $500 undisclosed concession than it would have been had the
transaction been executed on the Curb, for in the latter event they would




unknown to the buyer (McMillan v. Arthur, supra, 169) in which
case the customer could rescind (Cannel,). Smith, 142 Penn. St.
25; 12 L. R. A. 395, and note) or keep the property and recover
the commissions on the ground that the broker breached the con-
tract and, therefore, did not act as his agent. (Roche z. Smith,
176 Mass. 595; 51 L. R. A. 510; Little v. Phipps, 208 lass. 331;
34 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1046). Of course if he elected to rescind, his
action would have to be against the seller; it would not lie against
the broker, for he would not be the selling owner but his agent.
(Williston Cont. § 1532.)" 128
First, as to the suggestion that plaintiff may recover in a
proper action the amount of the secret profits. This seems clear.
As commonly expressed, a person in plaintiff's position has the
power to affirm and ratify the transaction and he thereupon may
sue for damages.- 9 Those damages may be measured (in cases
where the "agent" has sold his "own" property to his "princi-
pal") by the secret profits 211 or by the difference between the
price the plaintiff paid and the market price on the day of the
purchase.131 In case the plaintiff grounded his claim on his own
losses the latter would be the measure and accordingly the dam-
ages might be only nominal.132 In case plaintiff sued on such a
theory in the Kinney case it is doubtful if greater recovery would
be allowed.13 If the brokerage fee and the secret profits were
considered as dual commissions it is clear that plaintiff could re-
cover the former 34 and even the latter. 35
The uncertainty arises in the court's statement of the rule
respecting rescission. Of course if defendants had acquired pos-
session of the shares and paid the price before plaintiff's order
was given them, there would be no doubt that an action for
rescission would lie. And likewise it would lie on the basis of the
analysis presented above which does not accept a standardized,
simple meaning of "ownership" but defines it in light of the
manner of the constitution of the inventory of a merchant and
the presence and dominance of an adverse interest.
But assume with the court that there was no "ownership."
Also assume that defendants may have been distributing the
228 Supra note 3, at 312-313, 247 N. Y. Supp. at 120.
129 See cases supra notes 80, 81, 82.
130 See cases supra notes 80, 81.
M31cNulty v. Whitney, supra note 80; Waddell v. Blockey, supra note 81.
132 McNulty v. Whitney, szupra note 80.
33 As evidenced by the other sales on the curb that day. See table mtpra
p. 963. The Appellate Division found (Record, p. 208) "That said stock
could not have been purchased on said day at a better, that is, a lower
price."
13 See cases supra note 76.




stock of "another." Is the statement of the court consistent
with legal precedent?
A resum6 of some of the major decisions shows several factual
situations. One is as follows: P authorizes A' to sell a plot of land
for a price stated. A by fraudulent misrepresentations 'obtains
T's promise to purchase for the price. The contract is drawn by
A between T and P. The transaction is consummated and T dis-
covering the fraud brings a bill in equity against A for rescis-
sion, tendering the deed and asking for restoration of the pur-
chase price. The prevailing view seems to be that the action
lies. Perhaps the leading case so holding is Peterson v. Me-
Manus.23' The court said:
"Speaking concretely, and on the assumption that fraud and
duress are akin, we hold that, where an agent, by actual fraud,
obtains money, he may be made to restore it in a suit to rescind,
though he is not a party to the contract, and though he has turned
the money over to his principal. If this were not so, an agent
needs but to serve a principal who lives in a remote part of
Africa, and upon whom it is difficult to make service, because
he can be served in Africa only, and so make himself safe, if he
transmit the money to his principal before the victim can seize
it. The whole of the argument for appellant overlooks that, while
rescission is the remedy sought here, the ground for seeking that
relief is the tort of McManus. The right to rescind has no sup-
port unless what was obtained was parted with because of the
fraud of McManus. It does not matter he is no party to the con-
tract, or that he obtained no personal advantage by the transac-
tion. If his fraud deprived the plaintiff of property, that fact
alone supports a judgment that McManus restore this property.
The rule of agency invoked by the appellant has its place in the
law of contracts, but not in the law of torts." 217 (Italics ours.)
The theory seems to be that repudiation of the payment on the
ground of fraud gives the defrauded party a right to receive back
that payment from the person who got it from him or induced
him to part with it.138 In other words repudiation of the pay-
236 187 Iowa 522, 172 N. W. 460 (1919). Cf. the earlier cases of Bosley
v. Monahan, 137 Iowa 650, 112 N. W. 1102 (1908); Maine v. Midland
Investment Co., 132 Iowa 272, 109 N. W. 801 (1906).
13 187 Iowa at 546, 172 N. W. at 469.
:3Accord: Schechner-Wittner Inc. v. E. A. White Organization, Inc.,
138 Misc. 768, 247 X. Y. Supp. 246 (1931); Moore v. Shields, 121 Ind.
267, 23 N. E. 89 (1889). The court said (pp. 272-273) 23 N. E. at 91:
"In an action for money had and received there need be no privity of con-
tract proved, other than such as arises out of the fact that the defendant
has received the plaintiff's money under circumstances which make it
against conscience that he should retain it. . . . In such a case the law
implies a promise on the part of him who is in the wrong to return the
money to the lawful owner." And see Hardy v. American Express Co.,
182 Mass. 328, 65 N. E. 375 (1902). Cf. Hedden v. Griffin, 136 Mass. 220
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ment is one thing; repudiation of the coztr.ct another. Though
A is not liable on the contract, he is for fraud. And the measure
of recovery for fraud is not restricted to damages.
Other courts hold to the contrary,139 restricting the remedy
against A to damages suffered and holding that restoration of the
subject matter of the bargain must be obtained from the other
contracting party, P. While the lower New York courts have
been divided on the point,1'0 there is strong indication from the
Court of Appeals that the latter is the view of that court.
Thus, in McMilan v. Arthur,241 cited by the Appellate Division,
defendant (who apparently was not a broker) called upon plain-
tiff at his office and informed him that he knew where he could
buy for plaintiff a quantity of stock of a certain company at $9 a
share and that he could not get the same for any lower price.
Plaintiff told defendant he might buy the stock for him. De-
fendant procured the certificates and delivered them to plaintiff
who paid the price (apparently to defendant). Subsequently
under similar circumstances plaintiff made two other purchases
at $8 a share, defendant telling him that that was the lowest
price and at the time of the last purchase that defendant had no
interest in the stock. Apparently defendant charged plaintiff no
commission but as represented, acted out of friendship for him.
It appeared that one Hyde "owned" the stock and agreed with
defendant that he would receive as his compensation one-half of
any amount he realized on the stock over and above $5 a share.
Of this plaintiff was ignorant. Plaintiff brought an action in
rescission to recover the entire purchase price with interest. The
trial court found that defendant acted as "agent" of Hyde; that
he did not act as "agent" of plaintiff; that the contract of pur-
chase was between plaintiff and Hyde; that there was no relation
of trust or confidence between plaintiff and defendant; that the
rule of caveat emptor applied. Judgment was for defendant.
This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The court,
assuming that defendant was agent of plaintiff, said:
"The contract of purchase vade with. Hyde, the vezdor of the
stock, was precisely the contract which plaintff authorized his
agent to mvke, and the principal could not, therefore, rescind that
(1884) ; Garrett v. Sparks Bros., 61 Wash. 397, 112 Pac. 501 (1911). See
also (1931) AGENcY RESTATEMENT, TE.NT. DRFAT No. 6, § 562, appendix,
pp. 89 et seq.
19 Taylor v. Currey, 216 Ill. App. 19 (1919); Butler v. Livermore, 52
Barb. 570 (N. Y. 1868); Marks v. Jos. H. Rucker & Co., 53 Cal. App.
568, 200 Pac. 655 (1921) ; Cohen v. Ellis, 4 N. Y. St. Rep. 721 (1886).
140 For liability see Schechner-Wittner Inc. v. E. A. White Organization,
Inc., supra note 137. Against liability see Butler v. Livermore, sPpra note
138; Cohen v. Ellis, supra note 138. Cf. Klotz v. Gordon, 117 N. Y. Supp.
240 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
14, 98 N. Y. 167 (1885), affg 16 J. & S. 424 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1882).
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contract by reason of any fraud perpetrated upon him by his own
agent, to which the vendor was not a party. Upon the execution
of that contract the title to the stock vested in the plaintiff, and
there is no principle of law upon which he could compel the agent
to assume its ownership and stand the hazard of the specula-
tion." 142 (Italics ours.)
The court went on to say that the rule of damages would be
what plaintiff "actually suffered from the fraud." This would
"not necessarily or probably be the price paid for the stock," but
the "enhanced price" paid over what the stock could have been
purchased for or at least the secret profits of the "agent."
The court remarked, however, that the evidence and findings of
the court below showed that defendant was not the agent of plain-
tiff. The ruling on rescission against the "agent," where he is
not a party to the contract of purchase and sale, may not then
be a square holding. But it seems to represent the view of the
Court of Appeals.143
But brokerage transactions usually are not cast into that mold.
The person who sells does not contract directly with the pur-
chaser. The contracts are made between broker and customer
and between broker and broker. 4 In the bilateral contract be-
tween customer and broker described above there are no other
parties but the two. Perhaps the customer under certain circum-
stances might have an action against the unnamed "principal"
142 98 N. Y. at 169.
143 Related questions arise as to the joinder of "agent" and "principal"
in a suit to rescind a contract of purchase and sale on the grounds of
fraud, the contract being made between plaintiff and the "principal," the
"agent" not being the "agent" of plaintiff. In Mack v. Latta, 178 N. Y.
525, 71 N. E. 97 (1904), where defendants separately demurred, it was
held that it was error to sustain the demurrers; and that the individual
defendants were properly joined. But in Ritzwoller v. Lurie, 225 N. Y.
464, 122 N. E. 634 (1919), the opposite was held and judgment sustaining
the demurrer and dismissing the complaint against the individual defend-
ants was affirmed. Accord with Mack v. Latta, supra: Henderson v. Lacon,
L. R. 5 Eq. 249 (1867); Lehman-Charley v. Bartlett, 135 App. Div. 674,
120 N. Y. Supp. 501 (1909), aff'd 202 N. Y. 524, 95 N. E. 1125 (1911).
Cf. Cox v. National Coal & Oil Inv. Co., 61 AV. Va. 291, 56 S. E. 494
(1907). And in Loud v. Clifford, 254 N. Y. 216, 172 N. E. 475 (1930),
Mack v. Latta was said to be the law in New York, the Ritzwvoller case
being disapproved. Accord with Ritzwoller v. Lurie, supra: Huffman v.
Banker's Automobile Ins. Co., 112 Neb. 277, 200 N. W. 994 (1924); Alex-
ander City Bank v. Equitable Trust Co., 223 App. Div. 24, 227 N. Y. Supp.
403 (1928).
See Comments (1925) 3 NEB. L. BuLL. 436; (1925) 25'COL. L. Rav. 504.
- That such practice in conformity to custom and usage is valid see
Horton v. Morgan, supra note 64. Contra: Robbins v. Maher, supr.a note
113, where the customer did not know of the custom. And see Bostock v.
Jardine, supra note 113.
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of the broker.14 5 But that would not impair the broker's own
1' The statement of the court that, if the action was based upon the
claim that defendants were "employed" by the "sellers" of the stock, the
action of rescission would only lie against the "sellers," suggests inter-
esting and important problems. Was F. J. Lisman & Co. the undisclosed
"principal" of the defendants? Was the Consolidated Automatic Merchan-
dising Corporation the "principal" of F. J. Lisman & Co., and in that
event, defendants "sub-agents" of the corporation? In other words would
actions either for rescission or damages for fraud lie against either F. J.
Lisman & Co. or the corporation? Those questions involve so many factors
and require such extended analysis that they cannot be answered here. A
few points, however, will be suggested.
There are at least three categories in which the relationship might be
placed.
(1) The corporation might escape liability on the grounds that through
an underwriting or bankers' purchase contract the banking group had be-
come "independent contractors" in the distribution of the sceurities. It
is hazardous to generalize since the existence or non-existence of that rela-
tionship is bottomed entirely on the contract made and the conduct of the
parties during the process of distribution. Under many such contract2,
however, as have seen actual use it would seem that that result should
follow. In fact the usual arrangement would amount to an allocation
of the process of distribution, for a consideration, from the company to
the bankers and an undertaking by them to perform that function as spe-
cialists in the field. No case directly in point has been found. But it would
not appear to be undue extension of those rules, which have evolved from
totally different factual situations involving liability for negligent acts
and, in part for contracts [See DOUGLAS AND SHANKS, CASES AND MA-
TERALS O N LOSSES AND AssETs (1932) Pt. I, c. I] to apply them to this
type of situation.
The same might well be true as between the banking syndicate and the
selling group on the theory that the function of selling had been allocated
directly to the members of the selling group, who in turn were specialists in
their field. Here again it is impossible to generalize. A translation of the rules
pertaining to "independent contractor" into terms of "control" [See Doug-
las, Vicarious Liability and Adwinistration of Risk, (1929) 38 YALE L. J.
594] would bring to light many such factors varying considerably among
selling groups as differently constituted.
(2) Or again, as between the company and banking group and be-
tween banking group and selling group there might be established merely
a vendor-vendee relationship with complete insulation by one from liability
for acts of another.
(3) But even assuming that under special situations the "principal"-
"agent" relation were established as between either the banking group and
the company or the banking group and the selling group the question
of the scope of authority remains. It is elementary that a "principal" is
not liable for every fraudulent act of his "agent." Yet even so, there still
remains the possibility of rescission. Even innocent "principals" may not
be able to retain the benefits of their "agents'" fraud even though in
a damage action they would not be liable. See Kennedy v. McKay, supra
note 75; Ellison v. Stockton, supra note 75.
The suggestion of this problem does not infer that there was evidence
that defendants in the Kinney case were "agents" of F. J. Lisman & Co.
There was none whatever. And, as stated by the Court, the complaint was
not drawn on that theory. It is clear, however, that there are so many
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obligation on the contract which he has made with the customer,
any more than it would in case any other person contracts in his
own name but in fact is acting for another.140 We have here then
a valid subsisting contract between plaintiff and defendants.
Those who are contracting parties should take the liabilities of
the contract as well as the benefits. One of those liabilities should
be the power of the promisee to rescind for the fraud of the
promissor.
The cases hold that where an "agent" acting for an undis-
closed "principal" has made the promise he is liable in such
action. 147 As stated by the court in Kerr v. Simons: 14
"An agent contracting in his own name cannot escape liability,
when sued on the contract, by pleading that he acted for another.
This was an oral contract and the evidence justified a finding that
defendant made it in his own behalf, he not disclosing or pre-
tending to act for the bank. One acting for an undisclosed prin-
cipal binds himself .... The remedies upon such a contrabt
must necessarily be the same as upon any other contract, one of
such remedies being an action for rescission." 14 (Italics ours.)
Of course there are differences between the promise of the
"agent" in such case and the promise of defendants in the broker-
age transaction. In the first place the former would usually be
an unconditional promise to deliver a commodity. In the broker-
age case it is not; for, as we have seen, there is only a commit-
ment to use reasonable efforts to find sellers, to acquire stock if
found, and to deliver that acquired. But that should make no
variations in the case from the normal brokerage transaction as to render
that result doubtful.
14See cases supra notes 87, 88, 91; and Mead v. Altgeld, 136 Ill. 298,
26 N. E. 388 (1891); Cox v. Borstadt, 49 Colo. 83, 111 Pac. 64 (1910);
Drake v. Pope, 74 Ark. 327, 95 S. W. 774 (1906); Cobb v. Knapp, 71
N. Y. 348 (1877); Hutcheson & Co. v. Eaton, L. R. 13 Q. B. D. 861 (1884);
Pike v. Ongley, L. R. 18 Q. B. D. 708 (1887), holding brokers individually
liable on contracts made by them. The last two involve the effect of
custom and usage.
1 Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va. 310, 92 S. E. 454 (1916); Patterson
v. John P. Mills Organization, Inc., 203 Cal. 419, 264 Pac. 759 (1928)
(possibly including unnamed as well as undisclosed "principals" in the
rule) ; Kerr v. Simons, 166 Minn. 195, 207 N. W. 305 (1926) ; Pugh v. Moore,
supra note 62 (suit to recover amount paid broker-defendant for bonds
vhich were worthless) ; Drake v. Pope, supra note 146 (suft against broker
to recover back the price where goods defective). Cf. Simmonds v. Long,
80 Kan. 155, 101 Pac. 1070 (1909). But see Parish State Bank v. Tremore,
25 Ill. A. 185 (1929). The power of the "agent" in such case to rescind
the contract as against his principal should be distinguished. Thomson v.
Thomson, 315 Ill. 521, 146 N. E. 451 (1925).
148 Supra note 147.
149 Id. at 199, 207 N. W. at 307.
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difference. °O It is the completed performance which plaintiff is
seeking to rescind. The obligation to deliver matures when stock
is acquired. The broker's obligation by the terms of the contract
is then as absolute and unqualified as the promise in the other
cases allowing rescission against the "agent." The differences in
the contracts in the two thus seem to be unsubstantial. Any
difference would, of course, vanish if in both cases there were uni-
lateral contracts. In each, acceptance would be the act of acquir-
ing the securities at the price stated.
In the second place, the broker acts for an unnamed as dis-
tinguished from an undisclosed "principal." And the general
view seems to be that rescission lies against such "agent" for a
cause existing at the consummation of such transaction to the
extent that the "agent" has not before notice of rescission and
in good faith changed his position."-"" It would be impossible,
however, to classify defendants in the Kinney case as innocent
"agents" within that exception. Furthermore, it is one thing to
refuse to place on an "agent" the hazards of a contract to which
he was not a party. It is quite different to make him bear the
burdens of the contract where he has promised performance and
where that performance is vitiated by his own fraud. In the
latter case there is not the enlargement of risks which there is
in the former. Accordingly the apparent view of the Court of
Appeals that rescission for fraud does not lie against the "agent"
who is not a party to the contract should not be extended to the
case where he is.
Moreover, as has been seen, the Kinney case does not involve
a simple factual pattern establishing clearly the relationship of
"principal" and "agent" between defendants and F. J. Lisman &
Co. °5b To deny recovery for the reasons given is to assume that
F. J. Lisman & Co. were "principals" (a matter not litigated, and
by no means clear) or to require extended litigation to prove
that the defendants were "agents" of F. J. Lisman & Co. rather
than "independent contractors" or "vendees." It would be one
thing to deny recovery against the "agent" of a disclosed or un-
named "principal" whether or not the "agent" is a party to the
contract. It is quite another to disallow recovery against an
alleged "agent" in such case where the existence of the "prin-
cipal" is as doubtful as it is in the Kinzey case. In contrast to the
difficulty of proving that relationship is the ease of demonstrat-
ing that defendants had acted in the manner peculiar to dealers
and merchants and therefore, as the trial court ruled, had become
iro Cf. Pugh v. Moore, supra note 62; Drake v. Pope, supra note 146.
1:a AGENCY RESTATEMENT, TENT. DuApT No. 6, supra note 138. The rule
covers cases of "agents" acting for either disclosed or unnamed "principals"
whether such "agents" are parties to the contract or not.
M Cb See discussion supra note 145.
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"'principals" in the transaction. Accordingly, it seems clear that
the remedy of rescission should be as available here as it is in
the foregoing cases where an "agent for another" gives his prom-
ise or where a broker sells, without disclosure, his "own" shares
to his customer.
The question remains, should rescission be allowed in cases in-
volving stocks subject to violent fluctuations in market price? It
may be argued that to do so is to impose extremely harsh penal-
ties-more harsh than an equitable adjustment might seem to
demand. There are several answers to this. In the first place no
exception has ever been carved out for such cases. The books are
full of cases of rescission against stockbrokers, some of which,
as we have seen, allow the action many years after the transac-
tions were consummated.115 And they are not by any means cases
where the defendants were crooks or glaringly fraudulent. The
slightest evidence of over-reaching has imposed the penalty, even
where apparently no damage was suffered. This being true it is
not inconsistent with precedent to impose such penalty in the
Kinney case. In the second place, the difficulty of assessing dam-
ages in the Kinney case and cases like it must not be overlooked.
As noted above it is impossible to determine ex post facto the
factors entering into the judgment to buy. The persuasion of the
defendants, however direct or subtle, is difficult to measure.
There is then considerable wisdom in applying a somewhat rough
and ready rule of thumb and recreating (so far as may be) the
situation as of the time of the original bargain. It may be that
considerations such as these have led the courts to invoke the
remedy of rescission without regard to actual damages and ir-
respective of the "abstract justice" in a particular case. The
difficulty of evolving exceptions which can be applied as workable
rules of law by courts and juries may well result in refusal to let
borderline cases fall without the rule for fear of the influence of
a "disintegrating erosion."
Any rule of rescission is going to operate where there is a
falling market.152 Those who sue are going to give the appear-
ance of sliding out from under bad bargains. But that factor,
so far as appears in articulated reasons of courts, has never
deterred the undoing of a fraudulent act; has never lowered the
standards of conduct for fiduciaries; has never restrained the
hand of equity. Reasoning then from precedent alone it is im-
possible to differentiate the Kinney case from dozens of others
251 See e. g., Rothschild v. Brookman, supra note 79 (six years); Williams
v. Bolling, supra note 121 (eight years).
152 In fact in cases like Williams v. Bolling, supra note 121, and Roth-
schild v. Brookmnan, supra note 79, the broker, as respects the security
he purchased from the customer, loses the appreciation in the value of that
security; and as regards the security he sold to the customer is saddled
with the decline in its value.
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decided differently by courts of great repute. It would be difficult
to justify differences in legal rules by degrees of downward mar-
ket fluctuations resulting from either changes in the value of a
particular security or from general market declines.
And finally, the penalty would not be difficult to avoid. It
should be no great effort to be fair and straightforward. At the
very least,' 33 confirmation slips can be made more informative,
raising flags of warning when equity and fair dealing demand it.
Such practices as prevailed in the Kinfey case can bring but dis-
repute to the business. The professionalization and prestige of
security houses can be increased and furthered only by the
higher standards of business which the trial court sought to im-
pose. They cannot be by the continuance of the practices which
the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals approved.
Canclusion
Though the specific problem involved in the Kinney case arose out
of secondary distribution of securities, it is not necessarily
peculiar to that. It might arise either on original distribution or
(no doubt more often) on redistribution. In these three processes
there is apt to be present a dealer's guarantee of investment
placement.
The problem is one of readjusting old rules, evolving from a
simpler (or at least a different) order, to these newer practices
and customs. That calls for appreciation and appraisal of the
marketing devices and procedures employed, their peculiarities
153 As said by the court in Leviten v. Bickley, Mandeville & Wimple, Inc.,
35 F. (2d) 825 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) at 826: "The confirmation slip ...
was not a part of the original contract, and in order to make it such the
defendant was bound to prove that Leviten knew the terms of the con-
firmation slips and understood them to apply to his transactions.. . . His
mere receipt of them was not conclusive evidence of a contract in accord-
ance with the terms they stated." (Italics ours.) See also the quotation
from McNulty v. Whitney, supra, p. 988. And as to the effect of confirma-
tions see IEYER, op. cit. supra note 55, §§ 109 et seq., Pearson v. Kurtz,
280 Pa. 34, 124 Atl. 272 (1924) ; Smith v. Craig, 211 N. Y. 456, 105 N. E.
798 (1914) ; Keller v. Halsey, 202 N. Y. 588, 95 N. E. 634 (1911) ; Donald
Friedman & Co., Inc. v. Newman, 255 N. Y. 340, 175 N. E. 345 (1931);
Thompson v. Baily, 220 N. Y. 471, 116 N. E. 387 (1917); all dealing with
the effect of notices and confirmations by brokers to customers insofar
as they add to, detract from, or otherwise change the contract originally
entered into between the parties.
Cf. Porter v. Wormser, 94 N. Y. 431 (1884), where the confirmation said
"Bought of" plaintiff-customer, the contention being that an "agent" can-
not buy of his "principal" without disclosure. The action was to open
and review the accounts between customer and broker. Defendant intro-
duced parol evidence that defendant did not buy but sold to others for
plaintiff. Over plaintiff's objection the court held that defendants could
show the "real transaction" and that "by mistake or inadvertence it was
misrepresented in the written advices."
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and differences as well as the features common to them all. When
that is done in the Kinney case it aids materially in dispelling
much of the magic in the word "own," of reducing it to terms
of adverse interest, and in turn of redefining that in light of
varying and almost endless factual situations. Such analysis
makes it extremely difficult to justify on any rational or prag-
matic basis the lower standard of fiduciary duty permitted in
the Kinney case for brokers who, unknown to their clients, act as
security merchants in the transaction but who may not carry in-
ventories.
